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EMERGENCIES END EVENTUALLY: HOW TO
BETTER ANALYZE HUMAN RIGHTS
RESTRICTIONS SPARKED BY THE
COVID-19 PANDEMIC UNDER THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Eric Richardson*
Colleen Devine **

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the novel
coronavirus (“COVID-19”) a pandemic, but even before the official declaration, UN member states began implementing emergency measures aimed at
1
curbing its spread. Restricting travelers from countries with high infection
rates; preventing inter- and intra-state movement; quarantines; surveillance
using mobile telephone data; contact tracing digital apps; stay-at-homeorders; limits on the number of people assembling in one place and other
restrictions on public gatherings have all been heralded as important tools
2
for bringing the global pandemic under control. But at the same time, the
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1.
See, e.g., COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L.,
https://www.icnl.org/covid19tracker/ (last accessed Sept. 30, 2020) (documenting government
responses to the pandemic that affect civic freedoms and human rights, focusing on emergency laws) [hereinafter COVID-19 Tracker]. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
notes regarding the methodology of the tracker that “[w]hile the Tracker seeks to represent all
countries’ responses to the pandemic, it reflects only the information that we have collected or
received. The absence of an entry for a particular country does not mean that country has not
taken measures that affect rights and freedoms.” Methodology: COVID-19 Civic Freedom
Tracker, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., https://www.icnl.org/methodology-covid-19civic-freedom-tracker (last visited Oct. 1, 2020). We use the Tracker in this article to highlight
trends in governments’ response and recognize that the Tracker my not be completely comprehensive for all measures taken by states in response to COVID-19 that may impact civic
freedoms.
2.
See World Health Organization, COVID-19 Strategy Update, 11 (Apr. 14, 2020);
see also Coronavirus Restrictions in Each State, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 20, 2020),

105

106

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 42:105

use of these measures raises important questions of international human
rights, including those related to states’ compliance with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR” or “the Covenant”). The
ICCPR recognizes the governmental need for emergency health measures
which may infringe human rights but does so while establishing crucial
safeguards, so emergency measures do not permanently erode human rights
3
protections. In particular, Article 4 of the ICCPR provides that states
should notify the UN Secretary-General if they intend to derogate from their
4
international human rights obligations because of a crisis. This derogation
power, however, is subject to the satisfaction of several conditions, includ5
ing the notification requirement. Surprisingly, six months into the pandemic only 21 countries have issued notices of intent to derogate in relation to
6
their COVID-19 measures.
This article analyzes the ICCPR standards that apply to emergency regulation in times of public health crisis and the tangled morass of legal tests
that have been used to balance human rights and emergency restrictions.
Under the Covenant a state that intends to restrict a right due to COVID-19
should follow one of three pathways: notify of the intent to derogate; issue a
reservation, understanding or declaration; or assert that the limitation is justified because the right at issue is limited and on balance, the limitation is
7
permitted by the language of the ICCPR. We argue that in the COVID-19
emergency, derogation best protects human rights and the treaty structure,
by providing opportunities for oversight and ensuring the end of emergency
restrictions after the crisis subsides. Certainly, states should issue notices of
derogation more often than the handful that have been received by the UN

https://www.npr.org/series/847328455/coronavirus-restrictions-in-each-state (last visited Oct.
1, 2020) (listing tools deployed or eased in U.S. states).
3.
See Emergency Measures and COVID-19: Guidance, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”], (2020), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/Emergency
Measures_COVID19.pdf [hereinafter Emergency Measures]; see also Diego S. Silva & Maxwell J. Smith, Commentary, Limiting Rights and Freedoms in the Context of Ebola and Other
Public Health Emergencies, 17 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (Jun. 2, 2015),
https://www.hhrjournal.org/2015/06/commentary-limiting-rights-and-freedoms-in-thecontext-of-ebola-and-other-public-health-emergencies-how-the-principle-of-reciprocity-canenrich-the-application-of-the-siracusa-principles/.
4.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
5.
Id. art. 4(2).
6.
See, e.g., Chapter IV. Human Rights: 4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION: STATUS OF TREATY DATABASES [hereinafter Derogation Notification], https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Oct. 1, 2020). This article focuses on the initial
six months of the pandemic, beginning when it was declared by the World Health Organization on March 11, 2020 through September 11, 2020.
7.
ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 4(3), 51(2).
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8

Secretary-General six months into the COVID-19 pandemic. Failure to notify of a derogation suggests that states are (a) ignoring the International
Human Rights Law (“IHRL”) implications of their COVID-19-related
emergency measures like travel restrictions, quarantines, restrictions on
group activity and surveillance, (b) acting under substantive portion of Article 4 while ignoring the procedural requirements, or (c) assessing that given
the limited nature of these rights under the ICCPR, no derogation is necessary.
The first half of this article addresses the harms flowing from these
three possibilities. The second half of this article looks in particular at the
third of these possibilities, a limitations analysis, and considers how it may
have been applied by states in their restrictions of three ICCPR rights: freedom of movement, privacy rights, and freedom of assembly. States rarely
explain their thinking under a limitations analysis, making it difficult to determine when a limitations analysis was used or by contrast when states ignored IHRL in their rush to impose COVID-19-related restrictions. The article then analyzes the harm from this uncertainty about how states are
justifying COVID-19-related restrictions and the potential damage from indefinitely restricting key rights under the ICCPR’s limitations analysis.
While ignoring IHRL is damaging, the alternative—assessing that emergency measures are justified on balance and not a rights infringement at all —
may be worse. If states assess that emergency measures are justified because
the underlying rights are themselves limited, the processes for restoring liberties and repealing excessive measures at the end of the emergency may
not be followed. This possibility suggests that restrictions on travel against
groups considered politically or socially undesirable, deployment of new
surveillance systems that impede privacy, blocking of public assembly and
democratic protest, and other human rights infringements caused by
COVID-19-related measures may linger long after the virus itself.
Finally, this article questions whether traditional tests remain adequate
for analyzing potential violations of three types of ICCPR rights in particular which contain a limitations clause: freedom of movement under Article
9
10
12, privacy rights under Article 17, and freedom of assembly under Arti11
cle 21. The ICCPR’s language in Articles 12, 17, and 21 has been boiled
down by the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comments and secondary sources like the Siracusa Principles into broad concepts of legality,

8.
Compare Derogation Notification, supra note 6 (showing that few states have issued formal notices of derogation), with COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (showing that most
states have enacted emergency measures in response to COVID-19). The COVID-19 Tracker
is a collaboration of the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, the European Center for
Not-for-Profit Law and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism.
9.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 12.
10.
Id. art. 17.
11.
Id. art. 21.
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12

necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination. We use our particular
perch in Geneva to offer updated factors that states should consider in balancing COVID-19-related restrictions with limited human rights. These factors often build on the work of UN Special Rapporteurs and civil society
and might be considered by the Human Rights Committee in updating its
General Comments. Our proposals and proposed best practices for better
balancing COVID-19-related emergency measures with human rights, as
well as for how to remove restrictions once the COVID-19 crisis ends, include:
• improving the link between legal, technical and medical
knowledge in crafting restrictions and considering less restrictive alternatives;
• ensuring an end date to restrictions either through derogation or
the proportionality prong of a limitation analysis;
• considering the specific disease prevention phase and local
conditions of the virus;
• prioritizing exercise of rights necessary in a democratic society;
• focusing on the availability of alternatives, especially online alternatives, for exercising rights temporarily limited during public health emergencies; and
• seeking technological solutions to minimize damages cause by
limitations, such as using digital contact tracing, deploying
privacy-protecting technologies, or offering the option of
online assemblies.
In sum, well-meaning but poorly considered restrictions in the name of
combatting COVID-19 threaten to undermine hard-won human rights protections and may, in fact, erode important elements of IHRL as a result of
overreaching implementation or a lack of rigorous analysis in how the restrictions are put and kept in place.

II. BACKGROUND: THE ICCPR, ESCAPE MECHANISMS, INTERNATIONAL
HEALTH REGULATIONS, AND THE HISTORY OF DEROGATIONS IN
TIMES OF CRISIS
A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on
December 16, 1966, and entered into force on March 23, 1976. To date, 173
13
parties have ratified the Covenant. Six additional countries, including Chi-

12.
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
13.
Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM RTS,
[“OHCHR”] https://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited May 18, 2020) (searching “International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”).
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14

na, have signed but not ratified it. As one of the core UN human rights
treaties, the Covenant, translates the negative rights in the Universal Decla15
ration of Human Rights into a binding treaty. Based on the inherent dignity
of the person, the treaty seeks to promote conditions within states for the en16
joyment of civil and political rights.
Substantively, the Covenant enshrines rights to physical integrity, liberty and security of person, procedural fairness and rights of the accused, in17
dividual liberties, and political rights. Mechanically, Article 28 of the
Covenant tasks the Human Rights Committee with monitoring states’ com18
pliance with the ICCPR. Comprised of independent human rights experts,
the Committee assesses compliance based on reports submitted by the
member usually every four years and issues findings based on the country’s
19
performance. In addition, the Human Rights Committee periodically issues
20
General Comments providing interpretations of the treaty obligations.
Likewise, the Siracusa Principles have become an important secondary
source analyzing and interpreting the ICCPR. Codified in 1985, following a
conference hosted by the American Association of the International Committee of Jurists in 1984, the Siracusa Principles are a significant attempt at
21
harmonizing principles on limitation and derogation in the ICCPR. While
neither the General Comments of the Human Rights Committee nor the Siracusa Principles are legally binding, both provide soft law influence and
22
guidance over the treaty text.

14.
Id.
15.
See Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections
/universal-declaration/human-rights-law/index.html (last visited May 18, 2020).
16.
ICCPR, supra note 4, pmbl.
17.
See generally id.
18.
Id. art. 28.
19.
Human Rights Committee, OHCHR, last visited May 18, 2020), available at
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx.
20.
Id.
21.
UN Econ. & Soc. Council, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984) [hereinafter Siracusa Principles].
22.
See Lottie Lane, The Horizontal Effect of International Human Rights Law in Practice, 5 EUR. J. COMP. L. & GOVERNANCE 5, 11 (2018) (commenting on the nature of the General Comments); see also Tracy Slagle, Mehdi Ben Youssef, Golda Calonge & Yanis Ben
Amor, Lessons from Africa: Developing a Global Human Rights Framework for Tuberculosis
Control and Prevention, 14 BMC INT’L. HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 1, 2 (2014) (commenting on
the nature of the Siracusa Principles); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31, 32,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (stating that if the ordinary meaning
of terms within a treaty cannot be interpreted based on the object and purpose of the treaty,
supplementary means of interpretation may be used).
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B. Escape Mechanisms
Many international human rights treaties contemplate the possibility
23
that governments might need to take special measures in a time of crisis.
The ICCPR contains several escape mechanisms that allow states to restrict
rights enshrined in the treaty’s text while remaining in compliance with the
treaty itself. Article 4 of the ICCPR provides that state parties to the Covenant may derogate from certain provisions of the treaty in times of emergency, but places restrictions on the circumstances and rights from which
24
derogation is permitted. Other substantive rights within the treaty contain a
limitation clause acknowledging that the right is not absolute and provides
25
member states the ability to undertake a balancing analysis. Outside of the
treaty text, member states may have issued a reservation, understanding, or
declaration at the time of ratification that can redefine or qualify the scope
26
of their obligations.

1. Article 4 Derogation
Article 4 of the Covenant provides the public emergency provision in
27
which states may take measures to derogate temporarily from some obliga28
29
tions prescribed in the treaty. It seeks to strike a balance between upholding the protection of human rights and maintaining the governmental order
30
needed to guarantee those rights.
Substantively, for a state to implement Article 4, there must be a public
emergency that both “threatens the life of the nation” and is “officially pro31
claimed,” necessitating a derogation. The Siracusa Principles provide additional guidance about what constitutes a public emergency which “threatens

23.
See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Laurence R. Helfer & Christopher J. Fariss, Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties, 65 INT’L ORG. 673,
674 (20111); see also Emergency Measures supra note 3.
24.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4.
25.
Dominic McGoldrick, The Interface of Between Public Emergency Powers and
International Law, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 380, 383 (2014); see Silva & Smith supra note 3,
at 53.
26.
Eric Chung, The Judicial Enforceability and Legal Effects of Treaty Reservations,
Understandings, and Declarations, 126 YALE L.J. 170, 173 (2016); Jack Goldsmith, The Unexceptional U.S. Human Rights RUDs, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 311, 312 (2005).
27.
Scott P. Sheeran, Reconceptualizing States of Emergency Under International Human Rights Law: Theory, Legal Doctrine, and Politics, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 491, 507 (2013).
28.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
29.
Id. art. 4(1).
30.
Sheeran supra note 27 at 492 (2013); McGoldrick, supra note 25 at 411.
31.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(1); Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 29 art. 4, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General
Comment No. 29] (stating “[t]he restoration of a state of normalcy where full respect for the
Covenant can again be secured must be the predominant objective of a State party derogating
from the Covenant”).
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the life of the nation” stating that an emergency must 1) be “actual or imminent”; 2) “affect[s] the whole of the population and either the whole or part
of the territory of the State”; and 3) “threaten[s] the physical integrity of the
population, the political independence or the territorial integrity of the State
or the existence or basic functioning of institutions indispensable to ensure
32
and project the rights recognized in the Covenant.”
The Human Rights Committee in its General Comments also articulates
a proportionality requirement, noting that measures derogating from the
Covenant must be “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,” and
33
occur in the presence of an emergency. Finally, the Covenant requires that
any derogation measure cannot be discriminatory based on race, color, sex,
language, religion or social origin and measures may not be inconsistent
34
with other obligations under international law. Therefore, derogations in a
time of public emergency are subject to the principles of necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination, and the requirement of compliance with obli35
gations under international law.
Procedurally, Article 4 also contains a notification requirement that
obliges state parties to “immediately” inform other parties through the UN
Secretary-General, stating the provisions from which they are derogating,
making clear their reasoning, and providing an additional communication
36
when the derogations are terminated. This notification requirement acts as
a safeguard by providing international oversight of compliance, discourag37
ing member states from abusing emergency power. It also helps ensure
derogations do not continue after the emergency by requiring the state to
communicate when the derogation is terminated and provide notification if a
38
state of emergency is extended. A state party that fails to make immediate
notification to the Secretary-General of derogation is in breach of its Article
4 obligation. The Human Rights Committee has stressed the importance of
39
notification on several occasions as more than a formality. However, the

32.
Siracusa Principles supra note 21, § II.A.
33.
General Comment No. 29, supra note 31, ¶ 4; see also Tom R. Hickman, Between
Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Indefinite Detention and the Derogation Model of Constitutionalism, 68 MOD. L. REV. 656, 665 (2005) (arguing that the “strictly required” standard
found in Article 4 is more demanding proportionality standard than the proportionality standard found in the limitation clauses).
34.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
35.
See Emergency Measures, supra note 3; see also Adina Ponta, Human Rights Law
in the Time of Coronavirus, 24 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.asil.org
/insights/volume/24/issue/5/human-rights-law-time-coronavirus.
36.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(3).
37.
General Comment No. 29, supra note 31, ¶ 17.
38.
Id.
39.
McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 422 (citing U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.469, ¶ 19 (El
Salvador) and U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.355, ¶ 24 (Uruguay)).
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Committee has not gone so far as to state that failure to notify would invali40
date an otherwise legal derogation.

2. Limitation Clauses
The ICCPR explicitly limits certain rights and allows them to be infringed, often for reasons of public health. For these rights, some restrictions
may be implemented based solely on the limited nature of the right. Clauses
qualifying the nature of liberties under the ICCPR recognize that certain
rights are not absolute and that the state may have a legitimate interest in
balancing the individual rights at stake with other rights or interests of the
41
society, including public health or public order. Unlike derogation under
Article 4, justifying an emergency measure because of the limited nature of
the right being infringed upon does not require a declared public emergen42
cy. When restrictions of rights are based on one of the ICCPR’s limitation
43
clauses, no notification procedures or additional oversight is required. In
this way, states restricting rights under a limitations clause can escape legal
scrutiny, avoid clear time limits on the restrictions imposed, and the ensuing
44
damage to human rights could continue indefinitely.
Five articles of the ICCPR expressly provide that public health needs
can justify limitations on the rights articulated by those articles. As demonstrated below the language regarding public health exceptions varies for
each of these rights based on the language of their respective ICCPR articles:
Article 12 sets forth the right to freedom of movement within a
country, the right to leave any country, and the right to choose
45
one’s own residence. Section 3 explicitly states the limitations on
freedom of movement:
The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public),
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others,

40.
Id. at 423 (citing U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.355, ¶ 24 (Uruguay) & Silva case, U.N.
Doc A/36/40, 130).
41.
Id.
42.
See id at 383 (stating that limitations can be permanent); Ponta, supra note 35 (stating “[e]ven in “ordinary times,” limitations on non-absolute rights or freedoms are permissible”).
43.
Compare ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(3) with ICCPR, supra note 4, art.12(3).
44.
McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 383 (stating that limitations can be permanent).
45.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art.12.
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and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the pre46
sent Covenant.
Section 4 of the Article then provides that “no one shall be arbitrarily
47
deprived of the right to enter his own country.” As such, Article 12 con48
tains two separate standards for limiting freedom of movement.
49
Article 18 encompasses the right to freedom of religion. The right may
be limited “subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamen50
tal rights and freedoms of others.”
Article 19 provides the right to freedom of expression, including the
51
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds.
The article explicitly states that these rights may be “subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health
52
or morals.”
53
Article 21 provides the right of peaceful assembly. With regard to limitations, it states:
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other
than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of oth54
ers.
Article 22 provides the right of freedom of association and also sets
forth specific limits:
“No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other
than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security or public

46.
Id. art. 12(3).
47.
Id. art. 12(4).
48.
See Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 27 art. 12 ¶¶ 11, 21,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 2, 1999) [hereinafter General Comment No. 27].
49.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art.18. In the second half of this article, scope and space limitations prevented us from analyzing restrictions on freedom of religion, expression and association but the same concerns and analysis with respect to limited rights that we posit could
also apply to these rights.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. art. 19.
52.
Id. art. 19(3).
53.
Id. art. 21.
54.
Id.
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safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health
55
or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
In addition, Article 17 of the ICCPR on privacy provides the freedom
from “unlawful or arbitrary interference with one’s privacy, family, home or
56
correspondence.” Article 17 does not explicitly mention limitations on
these rights for reasons of public health, but privacy is a limited right because the Article expressly provides for freedom from “unlawful or arbitrary
57
interference,” not from any interference.

a. Standards for Judging Limitations
While the text of the ICCPR provides inconsistent standards for when a
limitation on substantive rights is justified, the General Comments of the
Human Rights Committee and the Siracusa Principles, among other secondary sources, propose to harmonize standards around the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination.
Legality: The limitation clauses of Articles 12(3), 18, 19, 21, and 22 all
58
contain language that reference legality Articles 12(3) and 19 state that
limitations must be “provided by law,” Article 21 states “in conformity with
59
law,” and Articles 18 and 22 state “prescribed by law.” General Comment
37 explicitly sets out that “in conformity with law” and “provided by law”
60
have the same effect in creating a legality requirement. The Siracusa Principles separately expand on the phrase “prescribed by law” defining it as
“provided for by national law of general application which is consistent
61
with the Covenant and is in force at the time the limitation is applied.”
While the Siracusa Principles do not develop any of the other legality for62
mulations, the definition does not appear to go beyond the general requirement of legality, nor has there been any debate around its use in the
63
Travaux Préparatoires. Additionally, in General Comment 22 on Freedom

Id. art. 22(2).
Id. art. 17(1).
Id.; see ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., NECESSARY & PROPORTIONATE:
INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO
COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE, (May 2014) 18–19, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents
/Issues/Privacy/ElectronicFrontierFoundation.pdf.
58.
ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 12, 18–19, 21–22.
59.
Id.
60.
Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 37 art. 21, ¶ 39 , U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/37 (July 23, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GC
Article21.aspx [hereinafter General Comment No. 37]
61.
61. Siracusa Principles, supra note 21 at § B.i.
62.
Id.
63.
See Rep. of the Comm’n on Human Rights, 8th Sess., Apr. 14-June 14, 1952, U.N.
Doc. E/2256 https://hr-travaux.law.virginia.edu/document/iccpr/e2256/nid-119 [hereinafter
Travaux Préparatoires]; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22,
55.
56.
57.
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of Religion, the Committee elaborates on the legality requirement stating,
“[l]imitations imposed must be established by law. . .”, suggesting that “prescribed by law” should be interpreted similarly to legality requirements in
64
the other Covenant Articles. In its most recent reports on Italy and the
United States, the Human Rights Committee confirmed that limitations to
65
Article 17, privacy rights, must conform to the principle of legality.
Some dispute exists about whether an administrative regulation or executive order meets the requirements of being “prescribed by law” under the
ICCPR principle of legality. Nowak argues in his Commentaries on the
ICCPR that “mere administrative provisions are insufficient” to meet the
legality standard, apparently relying on a hierarchy of laws analysis that a
regulation does not rise to sufficient level to place substantive limits on a
66
treaty provision. Others have disagreed, contending that an Executive Order or administrative regulation, properly passed and appropriately based on
delegated authority, remains lawful even if it potentially limits a treaty
67
right. The difference need not concern us here. As of September 2020, only about thirteen percent of over 323 COVID-19-restricting measures documented by a leading civil society/UN database (“COVID-19 Tracker”)
were adopted by legislation; the remaining measures were authorized by ex68
ecutive or administrative order or practice. Given the reality that most
states have imposed limitations through executive or administrative actions,
it would arbitrarily cut short this article’s analysis to overlook the dozens of
restrictions passed by executive or administrative action because they fail
69
Nowak’s test of legality. Our primary concern remains that states should
more rigorously analyze the impact of their COVID-related restrictions on
key ICCPR rights.
Necessity and Proportionality: All five of the limitation clauses from
the ICCPR which single out public health include the phrase “necessary” in
70
describing the grounds justifying a limitation on those rights. The Siracusa

art. 32 (stating that if the ordinary meaning of terms within a treaty cannot be interpreted
based on the object and purpose of the treaty in conformity with art. 31, supplementary means
including the preparatory work of the treaty may be used to determine meaning).
64.
See Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 22 art. 18 ¶ 8, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (Jul. 30, 1993) [hereinafter General Comment No. 22].
65.
See Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], Concluding Observations on the Fourth
Periodic Report of the United States of America ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4
(Apr. 23, 2014); Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], Concluding Observations on the Sixth
Periodic Report of Italy ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/ITA/CO/6 (May 1, 2020).
66.
MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 270 (2d ed. 2005).
67.
Id.
68.
COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (comparing by “Type” that only 43 of over 323
measures were authorized by law).
69.
See, e.g., id.
70.
ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 12, 18–19, 21–22.

116

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 42:105

Principles expand further on “necessary” stating that it implies that a limitation:
(a) is based on one of the grounds justifying limitations recognized
by the relevant article of the Covenant,
(b) responds to a pressing public or social need,
(c) pursues a legitimate aim, and
71
(d) is proportionate to that aim.
The Siracusa Principles also state that “[a]ny assessment as to the necessity of a limitation shall be made on objective considerations” and that “a
state shall use no more restrictive means than are required for the achieve72
ment of the purpose of the limitation.” The General Comments affirm that
the principles of necessity and proportionality apply to Freedom of Move73
74
75
ment, Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Religion and Freedom of
76
Assembly.
The application of these tests to Article 17’s Right to Privacy is more
complicated. Because Article 17 protects from “unlawful” interference with
privacy, the legality test is incorporated in the Article’s terms. But the analysis of necessity and proportionality is more roundabout. With respect to
privacy, General Comment 16 of the Human Rights Committee defines nonarbitrary interference with privacy as (1) consistent with the provisions,
aims, and objectives of the ICCPR and (2) “reasonable in the particular cir77
cumstances.” This test from General Comment 16 is further refined in the
UN Human Rights Committee opinion in Van Hulst v. Netherlands to encompass the tests of necessity and proportionality found in the other clauses,
78
and to ask whether the restricting measure has a legitimate aim. The UN
Special Rapporteur on Combatting Terrorism has similarly concluded that a
limitations analysis under Article 17 should meet the requirements of Gen79
eral Comment 27. Of General Comment 27’s several requirements, the
most pertinent state:

71.
Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, § I.A.10.
72.
Id., § I.A.11.
73.
General Comment No. 27, supra note 48, ¶ 16.
74.
Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 34 art.19 para. 22, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter General Comment No. 34].
75.
General Comment No. 22, supra note 64, ¶ 8.
76.
General Comment No. 37, supra note 60, ¶ 40.
77.
Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 16 art. 17 ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (Apr. 8, 1988) [hereinafter General Comment No. 16].
78.
Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], Van Hulst v. the Netherlands, Communication
No. 903/2000 ¶ 7.10 [hereinafter Van Hulst v. the Netherlands] (views adopted on Nov.1,
2004, during the eighty-second session).
79.
See Martin Scheinin (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering
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(e) For a restriction to be permissible, it is not enough that it serves
one of the enumerated legitimate aims; it must be necessary for
reaching the legitimate aim; and
(f) Restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those
which might achieve the desired result; and they must be propor80
tionate to the interest to be protected.
Given specific reference in other limitation clauses of the ICCPR to
81
public health, we assume protection of public health can be “one of the
enumerated legitimate aims” that could also limit privacy rights. In this
way, the tests of necessity and proportionality are also among the standards
secondary sources have used to determine whether “arbitrary and unlawful”
82
interference with privacy has occurred under ICCPR Article 17.
In a democratic society: The phrase “in a democratic society” appears
83
84
to be a separate and distinct requirement, unique to Articles 12(3), 21,
85
and 22. The Siracusa Principles recognize this phrase “as imposing a further restriction on the limitation clauses it qualifies” and is meant to ensure
that the limitations “do not impair the democratic functioning of the socie86
ty.” The Travaux Préparatoires reveal that the addition of the phrase “in a
democratic society” was also debated with regard to Article 19, but ulti87
mately not included. The amendments to include the phrase in the limita88
tion clauses were put forth by France. Other member states were concerned that the phrase was “not susceptible [to] precise interpretation and,
since [the phrase was] frequently used as terms of abuse, [was] not suitable
89
90
for inclusion in the covenant,” yet the language was passed for Article 21
91
and Article 22.

Terrorism ¶ 17 A/HRC/13/37 (Dec. 28, 2009), https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies
/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-37.pdf.
80.
See General Comment No. 27, supra note 48, ¶¶ 14–15.
81.
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 12, 18, 19, 21–22.
82.
See General Comment No. 16, supra note 77, paras. 4, 7, 8; Van Hulst v. The
Netherlands, supra note 78, ¶ 7.10.
83.
See General Comment No. 27, supra note 48, ¶ 11 (applying the “in a democratic
society” standard to art. 12(3)).
84.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 21.
85.
Id. art 22.
86.
Siracusa Principles, supra note 21 § I.A.ii.
87.
Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 63, at 239–41.
88.
Id. at 207–08, 239–41.
89.
Id. at 243.
90.
Id. at 207.
91.
Id. at 249.
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Non-discrimination: The Siracusa Principles also make clear that all the
limitations are subject to the non-discrimination principle found in Article
92
2(1) of the Covenant. It is interesting to note that the grounds on which
discrimination is prohibited in Article 2 are drafted differently than the
93
grounds in Article 4. When compared to Article 4, Article 2 includes the
additional grounds of “political or other opinion,” “national origin,” “prop94
erty,” “birth,” and “other status.” While “other status” may appear broad,
the Human Rights Committee has been reluctant to define it, instead decid95
ing its meaning on a case by case basis. A limitation may differentiate
based on a protected status “if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legiti96
mate under the Covenant.”
While only treaty language is binding on member states, these soft law
mechanisms are considered influential in the interpretation and establish97
ment of customary international law. As such, a legally rigorous analysis
of COVID-19-related measures under the limitation clauses in Articles
12(3), 17, 18, 19, 21, and 22 should focus on the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, and, where relevant, non-discrimination. Articles
12(3), 21, and 22 have the additional requirement of meeting the “in a democratic society” standard. We analyze states’ COVID-19-related restrictions
on freedom of movement, privacy, and freedom of association later in this
article by primarily focusing on these tests.

3. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations
In addition, some member states qualified their consent to ICCPR provisions at the time of ratification using a reservation, an understanding, or a
declaration (“RUD”), which may impact the lawfulness of their COVID-1998
related restrictions. By way of example, the United States and Australia,
included a general RUD to the Covenant, limiting the treaty to the scope of
99
their constitutional powers. The United States specifically notes that Arti-

92.
Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, § I.A.9.
93.
Compare ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2(1) with ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
94.
Id.
95.
MARINA SHARPE, THE REGIONAL LAW OF REFUGEE PROTECTION IN AFRICA 108
(2018).
96.
Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 18 ¶ 13, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Nov. 10, 1989) [hereinafter General Comment No. 18].
97.
See Lane, supra note 22; see also Slagle et al., supra note 22.
98.
Chung, supra note 26, at 173; Goldsmith supra note 26, at 312.
99.
Australia attached the declaration: “Australia has a federal constitutional system in
which legislative, executive and judicial powers are shared or distributed between the Commonwealth and the constituent States. The implementation of the treaty throughout Australia
will be effected by the Commonwealth, State and Territory authorities having regard to their
respective constitutional powers and arrangements concerning their exercise.” International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Declarations and Reservations (2020), U.N. TREATY
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100

cles 1-27 of the Covenant are not self-executing. As a result, the ICCPR
101
cannot be directly enforced domestically in the United States.
Other counties directed their RUDs at more specific provisions. As related to the ICCPR articles discussed here, France included a reservation
specific to Article 4 stating that the emergency powers in the French Consti102
tution are to be understood as meeting the purpose of Article 4. France also specified that the phrase “‘to the extent strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation’ cannot place a limit on the power of the President to take
103
‘the measures required by the circumstances.’” Likewise, Trinidad and
104
Tobago also reserved the right not to apply Article 4(2) in full. The United
States includes an understanding related to the discrimination clause in Article 4(1) and states that it does not bar distinctions that may “have a disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular status” in line with the United
105
States’ Constitution. Moreover, many states have issued RUDs relevant to
the specific articles that may be most impacted by COVID-19-related
106
measures, including Article 12, Article 17, and Article 21.

C. World Health Organization’s (“WHO”) International
Health Regulations
When limitations are invoked to protect public health, the Siracusa
principles affirm that “due regard should be given to the international health
107
regulations of the World Health Organization.” The International Health
Regulations (“IHRs”) are a form of administrative law updated in 2005.
IHRs give the WHO Director-General power to declare a public health
emergency of international concern and to issue temporary recommendations relevant to address the emergency, in consultation with the WHO’s
108
Emergency Committee. On January 30, 2020, the WHO’s Emergency
Committee declared a public health emergency of international concern,

COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Oct. 14, 2020) [hereinafter Declarations and Reservations]; see Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 313 (stating that the United States attached an understanding that the provisions it consented to were no more stringent than the analogous rule
under the Constitution).
100.
Declarations and Reservations, supra note 99.
101.
Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 318.
102.
Declarations and Reservations, supra note 99.
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
See id.
107.
Siracusa Principles, supra note 21 at § I.B.iv.26.
108.
Constitution of the World Health Org. art. 2(k), July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 14
U.N.T.S. 185; see, e.g., World Health Org. [“WHO’], Revision of the International Health
Regulations, WHA58.3 (May 23, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_
files/WHA58/ WHA58_3-en.pdf [hereinafter Revised IHR].
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signaling to member states the need to take action against COVID-19. In
April, the WHO’s Independent Oversight Advisory Committee proposed
updating the IHRs to take account of lessons learned from addressing
110
COVID-19. The WHO also has responsibilities for monitoring and collecting information from states about pandemics, but has been criticized for
111
failing to use those powers adequately or early enough.
While the IHRs consist of regulations, some commentators have suggested that they operate like a treaty to the extent they are binding on gov112
ernments in certain circumstances. Article 3(1) of the regulations provides
that they should be implemented, “with full respect for the dignity, human
113
rights, and fundamental freedoms of persons.” The IHRs were designed so
that the declaration of a public health emergency of international concern is
consistent with the kind of emergency contemplated under Article 4 of the
114
ICCPR. At least one commentator has suggested that the types of temporary recommendations envisaged under the IHRs would necessitate gov115
ernments to act under limitations included in the ICCPR. This would not
require governments to use a derogation analysis because the measures envisaged under Article 18 of the regulations primarily focus on measures
which would infringe upon the right to privacy, the right to liberty (related
116
to forced health quarantine detention) and the freedom of movement.

D. History of Derogation in Times of Crisis
Since the ICCPR’s entry into force in 1976, an array of member states
have provided notice of derogation. These include states that have experienced periods of civil unrest or threats of terrorism, as well as UN Security
117
Council members. Some states have notified a derogation only once,
118
whereas others have issued multiple notices a year. Several competing po-

109.
Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir. Gen., World Health Org., Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020).
110.
Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee for the WHO Health Emergencies
Programme, Interim report on WHO’s response to COVID-19 7 (May 14, 2020).
111.
Id.; see also Jennifer Shkabatur, A Global Panopticon - The Changing Role of International Organizations in the Information Age, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 159, 171 (2011).
112.
LAWRENCE GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 35 (2014).
113.
Revised IHR, supra note 108, art. 3(1).
114.
Andraž Zidar, WHO International Health Regulations and Human Rights: From
Allusions to Inclusion 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. L. 505, 508 (Jun. 23, 2015).
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al. supra note 23, at 678; see Derogation Notification
supra note 6.
118.
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 23, at 678; see Derogation Notification
supra note 6.
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litical theories in international relations discuss why states derogate, but
this article focuses on the legal consequences of the decision whether to
derogate in response to COVID-19.
Although the drafting history reveals that war was seen as the paramount example of a public emergency requiring derogation under Article
120
4, historically the vast majority of derogations have been in response to an
121
internal threat. Examples include:
insurrection situations (Algeria, Ecuador), vandalism and the use of
firearms (Argentina), serious political and social disturbances (Bolivia, Yugoslavia), terrorist activities (Azerbaijan, Chile, Colombia,
Israel, Nepal, Peru, United Kingdom), subversive activities (Ecuador, Bolivia), serious internal unrest caused by an economic crisis
(Ecuador, Bolivia), natural disasters (Guatemala, Ecuador), clashes
between demonstrators and defense forces (Panama), acts of sabotage (Peru, Sri Lanka), violence caused by drug traffickers (Colombia, Peru), need to avert a civil war, economic anarchy and destabilization of state and social structures (Poland), violent nationalistic
clashes (Russian Federation), civil war, a very chaotic socioeconomic and political situation, lawlessness and armed robbery
(Sudan), the threat from international terrorism (United Kingdom),
or the attempt to assassinate the President of the Republic (Vene122
zuela).
In several instances, the Human Rights Committee has been critical of
member states’ use of derogation. Broadly, these criticisms can be classified
123
as a derogation from non-derogable rights, derogation in situations not
124
125
covered by Article 4, and failure to provide notice of derogation.

119.
For a discussion of the theory of why states derogate, see generally Emilie M.
Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 23.
120.
Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in
Armed Conflict in THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 57, 63 (Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016).
121.
Angelika Siehr, Derogation Measures under Article 4 ICCPR, with Special Consideration of the ‘War against International Terrorism’, 47 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 545, 550
(2004).
122.
Id.; see Derogation Notification supra note 6.
123.
General Comment No. 29, supra note 31, at ¶ 7 fn. 4 (citing the following comments/concluding observations: Dominican Republic (1993), CCPR/C/79/Add.18, ¶ 4; Jordan
(1994) CCPR/C/79/Add.35, ¶ 6; Nepal (1994) CCPR/C/79/Add.42, ¶ 9; Russian Federation
(1995), CCPR/C/79/Add.54, ¶ 27; Zambia (1996), CCPR/C/79/Add.62, ¶ 11; Gabon (1996),
CCPR/C/79/Add.71, ¶ 10; Colombia (1997) CCPR/C/79/Add.76, ¶ 25; Israel (1998),
CCPR/C/79/Add.93, ¶ 11; Iraq (1997), CCPR/C/79/Add.84, ¶ 9; Uruguay (1998)
CCPR/C/79/Add.90, ¶ 8; Armenia (1998), CCPR/C/79/Add.100, ¶ 7; Mongolia (2000),
CCPR/C/79/Add.120, ¶ 14; Kyrgyzstan (2000), CCPR/CO/69/KGZ, ¶12.)
124.
Id. ¶ 3 fn. 1 (citing the following comments/concluding observations: United Republic of Tanzania (1992), CCPR/C/79/Add.12, ¶ 7; Dominican Republic (1993),
CCPR/C/79/Add.18, ¶ 4; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (1995),
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Before COVID-19, only two states used Article 4 notification to address a public health crisis, despite numerous states enacting emergency
126
health measures. Guatemala notified a derogation in May 2009 after de127
claring a public health emergency due to the H1N1 epidemic. In 2006,
Georgia notified the Secretary-General following a presidential decree to
128
prevent the spread of bird flu. At the time of writing, only Argentina, Armenia, Chile, Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan Latvia, Namibia, Paraguay, Peru, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, the
State of Palestine, and Thailand have notified the UN of derogation due to
129
the COVID-19 pandemic.

III. ARE STATES PROPERLY CONSIDERING WHETHER COVID-19RELATED EMERGENCY HEALTH MEASURES REQUIRE A DEROGATION
OR BALANCING OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS?
Since very few states have issued a derogation notice related to their
COVID-19 emergency responses, it appears states are either (a) ignoring
international human rights principles; (b) failing to follow the procedural
requirements of Article 4; or (c) acting under the substantive limitation
clauses. In this section, we will consider the harms caused specifically by
each of these explanations as well as the overall harm created by uncertainty
over if and how states are justifying their restrictions under the ICCPR.

A. Are States Analyzing Human Rights Damage Caused by
COVID-19 Restrictions?
Given the extraordinary death toll and economic impact of the COVID19 emergency, it is not surprising that states quickly adopted emergency
measures, nor is it surprising that states heavily value protection of public
health as balanced against other human rights considerations. The small
number of states issuing a notice of derogation compared with the rapid and

CCPR/C/79/Add.55, ¶ 23; Peru (1996), CCPR/C/79/Add.67, ¶ 11; Bolivia (1997),
CCPR/C/79/Add.74, ¶ 14; Colombia (1997), CCPR/C/79/Add.76, ¶ 25; Lebanon (1997),
CCPR/C/79/Add.78, ¶ 10; Uruguay (1998), CCPR/C/79/Add.90, ¶ 8; Israel (1998),
CCPR/C/79/Add.93, ¶ 11).
125.
Id. ¶ 17 fn. 10 (citing comments/concluding observations on Peru (1992)
CCPR/C/79/Add.8, ¶ 10; Ireland (1993) CCPR/C/79/Add.21, ¶ 11; Egypt (1993),
CCPR/C/79/Add.23, ¶ 7; Cameroon (1994) CCPR/C/79/Add.33, ¶ 7; Russian Federation
(1995), CCPR/C/79/Add.54, ¶ 27; Zambia (1996), CCPR/C/79/Add.62, ¶11; Lebanon (1997),
CCPR/C/79/Add.78, ¶ 10; India (1997), CCPR/C/79/Add.81, ¶ 19; Mexico (1999),
CCPR/C/79/Add.109, ¶12).
126.
See Derogation Notification, supra note 6.
127.
Id. at Guatemala (May 6, 2020).
128.
Id. at Georgia (Mar. 7, 2006).
129.
See id. (listing as defined by the UN Treaty Collection Depository).
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almost universal imposition of restrictions on human rights for COVID-19
related reasons raises significant questions about whether ICCPR requirements have been upheld under either a limitations analysis or a derogation
130
analysis.
The ICCPR requires that any emergency measure which restricts rights should be legal, necessary, proportionate, and nondiscriminato131
ry. Failure to conduct a clear analysis or file a notice of derogation also
makes it challenging for individuals and international bodies, such as the
Human Rights Committee, to look back after an emergency has ended to
consider whether measures put in place because of the emergency have been
rescinded or modified to restore liberties that may have been infringed.

1. Damage Caused by Ignoring International Human Rights Principles
If member states are failing to conduct any analysis of their obligations
under the ICCPR in implementing their emergency measures in response to
COVID-19, both individuals and the international legal system will suffer.
For individuals, they may not receive the human rights protections that are
132
the object and purpose of the ICCPR. Domestic law may protect some
rights in the face of emergency measures, but the ICCPR sets universal
133
standards for all. Failing to conduct a legal analysis under the ICCPR has
the potential to produce several harms. First, states might improperly derogate from rights that are deemed non-derogable under the treaty. Second,
states may not provide the notice required by Article 4, reducing oversight
134
by the international community. Third, measures may not be time-limited
and may continue even after their value in combating the pandemic has
passed. Fourth, states may not analyze whether emergency measures are legal, necessary, proportionate, and adhere to the principles of nondiscrimination.

130.
By the sheer volume of COVID-inspired restrictions as opposed to the limited
number of derogations, it appears that states are not conducting a rigorous limitations analysis
or concluding that public health trumps other human rights without much rigor in their balancing analysis. Compare Derogation Notification, supra note 6 (showing only 22 states have
issued formal notices of derogation ), with COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (showing that
most states have enacted emergency measures in response to COVID-19). Unless a state mentions its balancing of human rights – as in the best practices we cite in the end of this article –
it is impossible to know whether it has rigorously balanced public health and other rights or
just ignored the terms of the ICCPR in passing COVID-related restrictions.
131.
Emergency Measures, supra note 3; Matt Pollard, COVID-19 Symposium: The
Courts and Coronavirus (Part 1), OPINIO JURIS, (Apr. 3 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020
/04/03/covid-19-symposium-the-courts-and-coronavirus-part-i/.
132.
See Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 24 para. 7, U.N. Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, (Nov. 2, 1994); Nahuel Maisley, The International Right of Rights?
Article 25(a) of the ICCPR as a Human Right to Take Part in International Law-Making, 28
EUR. J. INT’L L. 89, (2017) (stating the ICCPR does not create these rights but rather defines
and establishes standards to measure them).
133.
See Maisley, supra note 132.
134.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(3).
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UN human rights officials have raised concerns about human rights
135
abuses and violations during the COVID-19 emergency. In order to advance the promotion and protection of international human rights, the UN
Human Rights Council appoints Special Procedures Mandate Holders to ar136
ticulate and focus on certain areas of human rights. A group of 17 such
mandate holders issued a joint statement on March 16, 2020, warning gov137
ernments not to abuse the COVID-19 emergency to limit human rights.
Their statement urged states to avoid security measures that respond to
COVID-19 with excessive or overreaching emergency powers reminding
states that “any emergency responses to the coronavirus must be proportionate, necessary and non-discriminatory” and that the “use of emergency
powers must be publicly declared and should be notified to the relevant trea138
ty bodies.” The statement also highlighted that the protection of public
health should “not function as a cover for repressive action nor should it be
139
used to silence the work of human rights defenders.”
Similarly, the chairs of the ten international human rights treaty bodies
called on states to adhere to international human rights law in their handling
of the COVID-19 crisis, such that no one is deprived of life-saving treat140
ment as a result of stigma, discrimination or other violation of IHRL.
Among the reasons to monitor human rights changes and violations in
times of emergency is the potential harm to dissenters, minorities and vulnerable populations that could plausibly be reduced through increased oversight. Governments have used public emergencies as an excuse to justify
discrimination, repression of political opponents, or to enhance marginaliza141
tion of minorities or other vulnerable populations. These actions underscore the importance of Article 4 limits on derogation and the requirement
that derogations which violate non-discrimination principles are unlawful.

135.
See COVID-19: States Should Not Abuse Emergency Measures to Suppress Human
Rights, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”], (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25722&LangID=
E [hereinafter Statement from UN Experts, COVID-19].
136.
See Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”], https://www.ohchr.org/en/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcome
page.aspx. (last visited May 18, 2020).
137.
Statement from UN Experts, COVID-19, supra note 135.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies call for human rights approach in fighting
COVID-19, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”] (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25742&LangID=
E.
141.
See Doug Rutzen & Nikhil Dutta, Pandemic and Human Rights, JUST SEC. (Mar.
12, 2020) https://www.justsecurity.org/69141/pandemics-and-human-rights/; see also Coronavirus and Civic Space, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. (Mar. 10, 2020)
https://www.icnl.org/post/analysis/coronavirus-and-civic-space.
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In addition to the direct damage suffered by individuals, treaty noncompliance undermines the systems created by the ICCPR and the Human
Rights Committee. Non-compliance can lessen the utility of the treaty as a
mechanism that civil society actors can use to pressure governments to respect human rights. More broadly, noncompliance with one core human
rights treaty may weaken general habits of compliance and erode the overall
142
international human rights regime. Thus, if member states fail to recognize the ICCPR in implementing their emergency measures, not only is the
legitimacy of the ICCPR harmed, but it creates a slippery slope threatening
143
adherence to the international rule of law in general.

B. Damage Caused by Failing to Follow the Procedural Requirements
of Article 4
Alternatively, member states might conduct a legal analysis under Article 4 of the ICCPR to implement emergency measures, but fail to follow the
notification procedures. While this may cause less damage than ignoring the
ICCPR, as states may consider the substantive principles of necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination, and compatibility with other obligations
under international law, divorcing substantive requirements of derogation
from the procedural requirements still creates problems.
When a state fails to provide notice of a derogation to the UN Secretary-General, other member states also do not get notice. The failure to provide notice of a derogation limits opportunities for oversight, analysis, and
disagreement with a state’s derogation practice. It disrupts the balance envisioned by the ICCPR, that emergency divergence from human rights requires oversight. The notification mechanism is meant to provide other
144
member states an opportunity to challenge a derogation, and it provides
the Human Rights Committee the chance to examine and to comment on the
emergency measures during the member state’s review or when issuing
145
General Comments interpreting the ICCPR. For states that are party to the
First Optional Protocol, establishing the individual complaint mechanism,
the notification procedure also informs potential victims who can then bring
146
a complaint before the Committee. Without the transparency provided by
the notification mechanism that allows the Human Rights Committee to
comment on the state’s emergency measures, jurisprudence related to
147
ICCPR derogations is stunted.

142.
See Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31 YALE
J. INT’L L. 189, 203–04 (2006).
143.
Id.
144.
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 23, at 677.
145.
Id.
146.
Id.
147.
The Human Rights Committee has commented on instances when states are acting
under Article 4 without providing notice of derogation, but this requires the Committee to in-
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In addition to providing the transparency necessary for dissent, the notification mechanism serves to reinforce the substantive requirements of Article 4. Article 4(3) requires that member states include in a notice of derogation the specific rights and freedoms derogated, the reason for derogation,
148
and notification of when the measures will be terminated. Providing the
specific rights and freedoms derogated as well as the reason for derogation
helps to ensure that member states are acting in a necessary and proportionate manner to the emergency. Moreover, requiring states to notify the Secretary-General when the derogation will be terminated reinforces the timelimited nature of derogations. During the first six months of the pandemic,
many of the states that initially issued notices of derogation have since notified the Secretary General of either extensions and/or terminations to their
149
states of emergency. This continued engagement of states with Article 4’s
notification mechanism strengthens the safeguards of oversight and demonstrates some states are reassessing the proportionality of the emergency
measures. Without providing notice of derogation or termination, these
safeguards are diminished.

IV. DAMAGE CAUSED BY ACTING UNDER THE SUBSTANTIVE
LIMITATION CLAUSES
Member states may also be acting under the substantive limitation
clauses found in the individual articles of the ICCPR when they establish
their emergency measures to respond to COVID-19. As previously discussed, member states utilizing this escape mechanism must still adhere to
the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination
150
to be in compliance with the treaty. However, when using a limitation
clause to enact an emergency measure, there is not an explicit temporal
limitation as there is with derogation, nor the need to declare a state of
151
emergency officially. As a result, states may keep emergency measures
limiting the rights of the ICCPR in place even after the crisis has passed.
Although the necessity or proportionality principles may capture the notion
that emergency measures cannot linger past the emergency, because no official state of emergency is required, in practice, a limitations analysis provides no demarcation as to when limitations must be repealed. Without a

fer intent to act under Article 4 and may not capture all instances where countries are using
Article 4 without providing notice. See supra fn. 124 for examples.
148.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(3).
149.
See Derogation Notification, supra note 6 (noting notices of extension from Armenia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, Romania,
San Marino and Thailand; noting notices of termination from Columbia, Estonia, Latvia, the
Republic of Moldova, Romania, and San Marino).
150.
See infra Part II.B.2.
151.
McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 383.
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transparent deadline for restoring rights and liberties at the end of an emer152
gency, restrictions might easily remain in place.
Additionally, unlike a derogation, states face no notification require153
ment when they act under a limitation clause in a time of emergency. Beyond losing the oversight that comes with a notification, states are not required to justify their limitations in writing, as they would be with a
derogation. Without a clearly articulated statement of necessity to argue
against, advocates have a harder time pointing to the moment when the necessity for the state’s imposition of a restriction expires. Notification may
also serve to constrain the state’s emergency powers and reflect a positive
commitment to the principles of legality and normalcy; features lost when
154
acting under a limitation.
Guidance by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’
(“OHCHR”) issued in April 2020 relating to emergency measures and
COVID-19 states that “[e]mergency measures, including derogation or suspension of certain rights, should be subject to periodic and independent re155
view by the legislature.” While the rules governing derogation requires
such review, nothing in the ICCPR requires a later review by a legislature,
or any other branch of government, for restrictions enacted under a limitation clause. General Comment 29 further underscores this point stating,
“[t]he restoration of a state of normalcy where full respect for the Covenant
can again be secured must be the predominant objective of a State party
156
derogating from the Covenant.” Because states may enact measures under
157
the limitation clauses regardless of whether there is a state of emergency,
jurisprudence does not exist regarding restoration of normalcy under a limitation clause, unless it is captured by the principles of necessity and propor158
tionality. While OHCHR may call for review and oversight for emergency
restrictions, if states enact the measures pursuant to limitation rather than as
a derogation, they face no binding treaty requirement or institutional mech159
anism to require a review when the emergency ends.

152.
The joint statement of Mandate Holders on March 16, 2020 contemplates this issue
stating, “authorities must seek to return life to normal and must avoid excessive use of emergency powers to indefinitely regulate day-to-day life.”. Statement from UN Experts, COVID19, supra note 135.
153.
Compare ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(3) with ICCPR, supra note 4, art.12(3).
154.
See Scheinin, supra note 79.
155.
Emergency Measures, supra note 3.
156.
General Comment No. 29, supra note 31, ¶ 5.
157.
Ponta, supra note 35 (stating “[e]ven in “ordinary times,” limitations on nonabsolute rights or freedoms are permissible”).
158.
See infra II.B.2.
159.
Id.
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B. About Which Escape Mechanism Member States are Using to Justify
COVID-19-Inspired Restrictions Undermines the ICCPR
Uncertainty about whether member states are undertaking a legal analysis when implementing restrictions on human rights to combat COVID-19
or not produces its own set of harms and undermines the Covenant, especially in the face of a global crisis.
For rights that are subject to both a limitation clause and derogation under Article 4, there is little guidance on when the scope of a limitation exceeds the clause, requiring the member state to justify its action through a
derogation. A member state may not invoke a derogation for what it could
achieve through a limitation, and the treaty encourages the use of limitations
160
rather than derogations. While the Human Rights Committee and the Siracusa Principles focus on when a limitation or derogation is permissible,
there is no clear standard for when a derogation becomes necessary. The Siracusa Principles state that the scope of a limitation shall not be interpreted
161
so as to “jeopardize the essence of the right concerned.” But it is clear
from member states’ disparate use of the derogation clause regarding
COVID-19 measures that confusion is widespread about the permissible
scope of the limitations and at what point a derogation rather than a limitation is required under the ICCPR. The division between limitations and derogations is further confused because principles such as proportionality and
162
non-discrimination are applicable to both. The lack of a clear standard
may lead to member states issuing a notice of derogation in a situation
where it might not be required, in essence using the derogation as a safety
163
net. At the same time, other member states may conceivably stretch the
limitation clause to avoid international oversight. In the case of COVID-19,
this could account for the disparate results where when undertaking the
same action some states use limitation clauses while others issue notices of
derogation.
The confusion between limitation clauses and derogations undermines
the Covenant in several ways. First, it disrupts the progressive structure of
the Covenant which envisions greater oversight and more restricted use of

160.
See General Comment No. 29, supra note 31, ¶ 4 (stating “[d]erogation from obligations in emergency situations is clearly distinct from restrictions or limitations allowed even
in normal times under several provisions of the Covenant.”); see also Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, para. 53 (stating “[a] measure is not strictly required by the exigencies of the situation where ordinary measures permissible under the specific limitations clauses of the Covenant would be adequate to deal with the threat to the life of the nation.”); McGoldrick, supra
note 25, at 384.
161.
Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, ¶ 2.
162.
McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 383–84.
163.
Emanuele Sommario, Limitation and Derogation Provisions in International Human Rights Law Treaties and Their Use in Disaster Settings, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISASTERS, 98, 113 (Flavia Zorzi Giustiniani, Emanuele Sommario,
Federico Casolari, & Giulio Bartolini eds., 2018).
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derogations as opposed to limitations which are less procedurally constrained but more limited in application. Second, it creates uncertainty for
observers as to whether member states are acting under a limitation clause
or if they are disregarding the notification provision of Article 4. Third,
member states are defining the scope of the limitation clauses on a regional
basis rather than universally. The global nature of the COVID-19 pandemic
highlights these issues as multiple member states are simultaneously grappling with their response to the same threat. As the global community proceeds to address other large-scale crises such as the War on Terror or climate disasters, the need to strengthen multilateral human rights instruments
with clear standards and consistent application will become more acute and
this analysis will prove useful.
The ICCPR’s escape mechanisms are implemented progressively. Rather than a general limitation clause as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR’s drafters included the limitation provisions within
the specific substantive right. This change “reflected a desire to tailor limita164
tions to assure maximum protection for the individual,” meaning limitations are only allowed on the grounds stated within the relevant Article. The
inclusion of limitations in the ICCPR recognizes that most human rights are
165
not absolute and require balancing individual and community interests. As
such, these rights can be limited permanently and still conform to the
166
ICCPR. In contrast, a derogation completely or partially eliminates an in167
ternational obligation. Because derogations cast a wider scope in restricting rights than limitations do, the Covenant confines their use to narrow circumstances and subjects them to the notification provision, allowing others
to monitor implementation. Unlike a limitation, when a derogation is used,
168
it must be time-limited. At the same time, the Covenant flatly prohibits
the derogation of certain rights, deeming the obligation to protect those
169
rights too important to be eliminated even in emergencies. In this way, the
ICCPR creates a progressive model in which increased restrictions on rights
are subject to narrower circumstances and greater oversight.
Based on this model, when an emergency situation arises, the Covenant
is designed so states first act within the scope of permissible limitations be170
fore seeking to eliminate an obligation through a derogation. However,
the Covenant does not provide clear standards for member states to ascer164.
Alexandre Charles Kiss, Permissible Limitations on Rights, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS - THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 290,
291(Louis Henkin ed. 1981).
165.
McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 383.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, ¶¶ 45(c), 48; Emergency Measures, supra note
3.
169.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
170.
See infra fn. 157.
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tain the permissible scope of limitations. This means states often deploy
derogations in a precautionary fashion, contrary to the ICCPR’s ideal priori171
tization. It also creates an incentive for states who want to avoid international oversight to stretch what can be properly accomplished through a limitation. The Covenant envisions increasing oversight as restrictions rise in
scope or severity—putting in stricter requirements for derogation than limitations. This balance is disrupted by states’ differing interpretations about
the scope of permissible limitations.
For example, Latvia was one of the first countries to notify a COVID172
19-related derogation to the UN on March 16, 2020. It justified using a
derogation because it would be impossible to assess limitations during the
173
crisis individually. Latvia is not the only state to approach derogation during the COVID-19 crisis in a precautionary way. Estonia’s notice of deroga174
tion said, “some of these measures may involve a derogation. . .” The use
175
of “may” suggests Estonia may not have intended to suspend rights.
While this prophylactic use of derogation respects the Covenant, it raises
questions about whether a derogation was truly necessary and appropriate.
The Human Rights Committee has also expressed concern with the
“underuse” of derogations. For example, the Human Rights Committee has
176
rebuked several states for failing to provide notice of a derogation. Other
states facing a public emergency have claimed to be acting under the limita177
tion clauses of the substantive rights. In 1976, the UK submitted a notice
of derogation to the Secretary-General concerning Northern Ireland but
178
withdrew the notice in 1984. In explaining the withdrawal, the UK stated
that the emergency continued, but there had been a change in the measures
179
for addressing it, suggesting it was now justifying its restrictions under a
limitations analysis. Because of ambiguity in ICCPR limitation clauses,
states over- and under- use of derogation to fit their agendas.
Further, when states enact emergency measures without providing notice of derogation, it is difficult to tell whether a state is acting under the

171.
Sommario, supra note 163.
172.
Derogation Notification, supra note 6.
173.
E-mail from Janis Karklins, Lat. Ambassador to the U.N. in Geneva to authors
(April 2, 2020, 12:51 PM CET) (on file with authors).
174.
Derogation Notification, supra note 6.
175.
Sommario, supra note 163, at 113.
176.
See infra n. 126.
177.
McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 384 (citing UN Doc. A/34/40, ¶ 383 (1979) (Cyprus), UN Doc. A/35/40, ¶297 (1980) (Suriname), UN Doc. A/54/40, Vol. I. ¶ 324 (Mexico),
and UN Doc. A/46/40, ¶¶ 618–56 (Iraq)).
178.
See McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 385 (citing UN Doc. CCPR/C/2/Add.8, App.II,
2) (stating the United Kingdom has “come to the conclusion that it is no longer necessary, in
order to comply with its obligations under the Covenant, for the United Kingdom to continue,
at present time, to avail itself of the right of derogation under Article 4.”)
179.
McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 385 (citing UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.594, ¶ 3).
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limitation clause, acting under Article 4 without providing notice, or ignoring its treaty obligations altogether. This uncertainty, whether real or perceived, undermines the treaty as a whole by creating distrust about the degree of compliance. The lack of a derogation notice also complicates the
Human Rights Committee’s task of evaluating emergency restrictions.
The lack of jurisprudence and clear standards about when an emergency
situation warrants derogation is also creating unhelpful regional variation in
practice which is incompatible with the treaty. With COVID-19, for example, Latvia was a first mover in March 2020, quickly followed by Armenia,
180
Romania, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and Estonia. This practice
within the UN’s Eastern Europe Group could appear to demonstrate a regional understanding of the importance of derogation as opposed to the
limitation in the COVID-19 situation. Likewise, during the six month period
this article focuses on eight countries from the Latin American and Caribbean Group have also issued notices of derogation although they did not move
181
as early as those in the Eastern Europe Group. In contrast, only one country from the Western European and Other Group (San Mario), two countries
from the Asia Pacific Group (Kyrgyzstan and Thailand) and three countries
from the Africa Group (Ethiopia, Namibia, and Senegal), have issued notic182
es of derogation. Because the ICCPR does not utilize the margin of appre183
ciation doctrine, such regional understandings of the derogation mechanism are not only confusing but incompatible with the treaty.
As the ICCPR is increasingly utilized to protect human rights in the
face of global threats such as terrorism and climate change, clear definitions
about the scope of limitation provisions are needed. Such clarity will help
states receive the proper oversight for their actions, limiting over- and under- use of derogations. It will also allow member states and the Human
Rights Committee to more readily and accurately assess compliance and to
prevent the emergence of conflicting regional understandings of the ICCPR,
strengthening the treaty regime overall.

IV. A RIGOROUS LIMITATIONS ANALYSIS FOR MEASURES INFRINGING
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
We now turn to a consideration of what a rigorous limitations analysis
might look like for travel bans, stay-at-home orders, quarantines, digital
surveillance, and bans on public gatherings, along with how international
human rights might be harmed by such measures. Most states adopted some,

180.
Derogation Notification, supra note 6.
181.
Id.
182.
Id.
183.
Dominick McGoldrick, A Defense of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument
for Its Application by the Human Rights Committee, 65 INT’L & COMP. L. QUARTERLY 21, 21
(2015).
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if not all, of these measures in response to COVID-19, but only twenty-two
184
have notified that they implemented a derogation. With respect to each of
three types of rights—freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, and privacy rights—we consider whether the restrictions states have imposed meet
the tests of legality, necessity, and proportionality, as well as nondiscrimination. In addition, we discuss whether other tests or additional factors might provide a better way of assessing compliance with the ICCPR in
our modern digital age and in the context of COVID-19 limitations. These
include assessing whether restrictions are necessary for a democratic society, looking at the COVID-19-related context in which specific restrictions
are imposed, encouraging consultation between health, information technology, and legal experts in crafting limitations, and considering how modern
technology and online alternatives impact the limitations analysis.
Many member states have curtailed the right to freedom of movement
in response to COVID-19. According to the COVID-19 Tracker and as of
September 2020, at least 107 countries have adopted measures limiting
185
freedom of movement. Both quarantines and travel restrictions have been
widely implemented as public health measures designed to stop the spread
186
of the virus. While limitations on freedom of movement vary widely in
scope, they can include restricting the right to leave a country, restricting
187
inter-country travel, and restricting the right to enter one’s country. At the
beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, such restrictions often targeted people in virus hot spots, but as the virus has spread, restrictions have become
188
more wide-reaching. In this section, we analyze (A) requirements for limitations on freedom of movement under Article 12(3) looking at quarantines
and travel restrictions; and (B) whether citizens legally can be stopped from
returning to their own country under Article 12(4).

A. Freedom of Movement Restrictions Under Article 12(3)
Article 12(3) provides that states may limit the right to “liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence” as well as the freedom to
189
“leave any country” found in Article 12(1) and Article 12(2), respectively.
Below we consider the two most salient emergency measures implemented
under 12(3): quarantines and travel restrictions.
In the public health sphere, a quarantine is defined as “the separation of
persons (or communities who have been exposed to an infectious disease,”
while isolation applies to “the separation of persons who are known to be

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See Derogation Notification, supra note 6.
COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
See Coronavirus Restrictions in Each State, supra note 2.
ICCPR, supra, note 4, art. 12.
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190

infected.” However, laws often conflate the two terms, referring to both
191
under the umbrella of quarantine. This article uses quarantine to mean
measures restricting individuals to their residence or other quarantine sites
and includes “stay-at-home orders” and “lockdowns.” Likewise, this section
considers travel restrictions limiting the ability to enter, leave, and travel
within a country. As in the real world, the precise contours between broad
quarantine and limits on inter-country travel are not well defined.
Because quarantines and travel restrictions can be employed to limit the
movement of potentially large groups of asymptomatic people, they are one
of the most aggressive and controversial public health tools for controlling
192
the spread of infectious disease. Historically, quarantines have been used
since the 14th century, when ships were required to sit in port for forty days
193
to protect coastal cities from the plague. Most recently, quarantines have
been deployed to combat both Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
194
(“SARS”) and Ebola. Similarly, states have used their borders as a control
195
point for stopping the spread of diseases such as Yellow Fever. In response to COVID-19, quarantine and travel restriction measures implemented by member states vary widely in scope and scale, ranging from border closure to mandatory geographic quarantines to stay-at-home
196
recommendations.

1. Legality
For a limitation on freedom of movement to meet the legality standard,
it must be contained in a “national law of general application, which is in
197
force at the time when the limitation is applied.” The COVID-19 Tracker
shows that most measures related to freedom of movement restrictions have
198
been implemented by an order, regulation, or law. Applied to the COVID19 situation, for a quarantine or travel restriction stemming from an order or
regulation to meet this legality standard, the power that places the limit on
freedom of movement must be contained in national law. Because quaran-

190.
Wendy E. Parmet & Michael S. Sinha, COVID-19 - The Law and Limits of Quarantine, NEW ENG. J. MED., e28(1), e28(1) (Apr. 9, 2020).
191.
Id.
192.
Mark A. Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola: Legal and Ethical Considerations for
Modern Quarantine, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 227, 227–28 (2015).
193.
History of Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, (Jan. 10,
2012), https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/historyquarantine.html.
194.
Rothstein, supra note 192.
195.
See New Yellow Fever Vaccination Requirements for Travelers, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., (Jul. 27, 2016), https://www.who.int/ith/updates/20160727/en/ (discussing how the certificate of vaccination against yellow fever is required for some travelers).
196.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement”).
197.
Emergency Measures, supra note 3.
198.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement”).
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tines are well-established public health tools, most states have laws allowing
the government to mandate quarantines or other legal mechanisms to im199
plement such measures. For example, Australia used an order, pursuant to
section 7 of the Public Health Act of 2010, in New South Wales to require
200
individuals to stay in their residence absent a reasonable excuse. Botswana declared a nationwide lockdown and curfew from 8 PM to 8 AM, using
regulations issued under the Emergency Power Act, which specifically al201
lows for limitations of freedom of movement. The United Kingdom implemented its freedom of movement restriction by law, passing the Coronavirus Act 2020, giving UK authorities emergency powers to address the
202
COVID-19 pandemic.
Article 12(3) also states that any limitation must be “consistent with the
203
other rights recognized in the present Covenant.” A limitation that is
properly passed according to domestic law should not, according to this
204
standard, conflict with the objects and purposes of the treaty. In a situation
where a person must leave a state in the context of asylum-seeking, an exit
205
ban could be incompatible with other ICCPR rights such as the right to
206
life or freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
States imposing restrictions need to examine the limitation in the context of
the ICCPR as a whole.
In addition, the OHCHR issued guidance on the legality standard, stating that “[t]he law must not be arbitrary or unreasonable, and it must be
207
clear and accessible to the public.” Even where restrictions have been is199.
See Rothstein, supra note 192, at 228.
200.
Public Health (COVID-19 Restrictions on Gathering and Movement) Order 2020
Under the Public Health Act 2010, 2020 (N.S.W.) Part I (Austl.), Government Gazette No. 65
of March 30, 2020 149–1163. (defining orders as executive measures including executive orders and presidential decrees).
201.
Emergency Powers (COVID-19) Regulations, 2020 Under the Emergency Powers
Act, Supplement C 2020 Part II (Bots.), Botswana Extraordinary Government Gazette, April
2, 2020; see also Emergency Powers, 1966, Chapter 22:04 (Bots.), http://extwprlegs1.fao.org
/docs/pdf/bot91330.pdf (defining regulation as measures that guide the implementation of law
and including “(a) make provision for the detention of persons or the restriction of their
movements.”).
202.
Coronavirus Act 2020, c. 7 (UK). The tracker defines laws as measures that have
been enacted through the legislative process.
203.
ICCPR supra note 4, art. 12(3).
204.
Siracusa Principles supra note 21, ¶ 5.
205.
See Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, (Full Text) PM’s Movement Control Order Speech
in English, NEW STRAIT TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.nst.com.my/news
/nation/2020/03/575372/full-text-pms-movement-control-order-speech-english
(illustrating
Malaysia as an example of a state imposing restrictions on exiting the country as part of its
COVID-19 response measures).
206.
Kate Ogg, COVID-19 Travel Bans: The Right to Seek Asylum When You Cannot
Leave Your Homeland, UNSW L., (Apr. 16, 2020) https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au
/publication/covid-19-travel-bans-right-seek-asylum-when-you-cannot-leave-your-homeland.
207.
Emergency Measures, supra note 3.
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sued in accordance with the legislative process, many states are struggling
with communicating the laws to the public. The New York Times reported
on confusion over quarantine guidelines in New York, noting “when the authorities do issue guidance or directives, they can seem contradictory or il208
logical.” The public faced similar confusion in the United Kingdom, with
contradictory messaging from government officials about the contours of
209
the lockdown order in London.
It appears that many, if not most governments have or have made some
effort to demonstrate legal authority to implement quarantines, and those
doing so in response to COVID-19 have followed their legal process,
whether that involves action by the legislative or executive branch of gov210
ernment. However, a rigorous legal analysis must ensure that the restriction comports with the rest of the ICCPR and that the public is informed
of the contours of any limitations in order to meet the legality standard.

2. Necessity
Restrictions on freedom of movement must be “necessary to protect”
211
the legitimate aims contained in the treaty, according to ICCPR standards.
In the instance of COVID-19, quarantines and travel restrictions must be
212
necessary to protect public health.
States have recognized the potential necessity of quarantines in their legal regimes. In the United States, for example, federal quarantine and isolation powers may be implemented in response to a closed list of diseases,
which include “severe acute respiratory syndromes” encompassing COVID-

208.
Andy Newman, Confusion Over Coronavirus Quarantines Feeds Anxiety, N.Y.
TIMES, (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/nyregion/coronavirus-nyquarantines.html.
209.
See Jill Lawless, UK Clamps Down to Fight Virus, but Confusion Still Reigns,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Mar. 24, 2020), https://apnews.com/5131953f9d8fe0b47c08accf
9241f499 (noting contradictory government statements regarding children moving between
households).
210.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement”) (showing that most
measures related to freedom of movement restriction have been implemented by an order,
regulation or a law, with the exception of the travel lockdowns in Wuhan and cities in Hubei
province which were issued by central government policy). But see Decision on the Extension
of the Temporary Measure, CONST. CT. REPUBLIC KOS., (Mar. 31, 2020), https://gjkks.org/vendimet-nga-seancat-shqyrtuese-te-mbajtura-me-30-dhe-31-mars-2020/. Although the
analysis was not conducted under the ICCPR, the Constitutional Court in Kosovo ruled that
the Law on the Prevention of Spreading Infectious Disease does not specifically provide for
the restriction of freedom of movement as required to limit the Constitutional right to freedom
of movement. Jack Robinson & Eve-anne Travers, Government Decision Restricting Freedom
of Movement Ruled Unconstitutional, PRISHTINA INSIGHTS, (Mar. 31, 2020)
https://prishtinainsight.com/government-decision-restricting-movement-ruledunconstitutional/.
211.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 12(3).
212.
Id.
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213

19. The U.S. Supreme Court discussed this sentiment in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, stating that it is necessary that a “well-ordered society” can enforce “reasonable regulations” to effectively respond to “an epidemic dis214
ease which threatens the safety of its members.” Given the broad use of
quarantines globally to combat COVID-19 and the potential of asymptomatic transmission, states are likely to find quarantines necessary to protect
public health. For example, the WHO recommends that “contacts of patients
with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 be quarantined for fourteen days
215
from the last time they were exposed to the patient.” The WHO has previously justified even involuntary quarantines based on its assessment of bal216
ancing between public health needs and freedom of movement concerns.
As such, most states will be able to satisfy the necessity principle in relation
to quarantines, although it should be reassessed as transmission progresses
and scientific understanding evolves.
However, the WHO has criticized the use of travel restrictions to combat COVID-19. In its updated recommendations, the WHO “advises against
the application of travel or trade restriction on countries with COVID-19
217
outbreaks.” The recommendation continues, “[t]ravel bans to affected areas or denial of entry to passengers coming from affected areas are usually
not effective in preventing the importation of cases but may have a signifi218
cant economic and social impact.” Further, sixteen global health law
scholars recently concluded in a Lancet commentary that imposing travel
restrictions against China during the COVID-19 outbreak violates the

213.
42 C.F.R. §§70.1–.9 (2015) (regulating interstate quarantine through E.O. 13295)
as amended by Exec. Order No. 13674, 79 Fed. Reg. 45671 (July 31, 2014). Under these orders, federal quarantine and isolation powers currently apply to the following diseases: cholera; diphtheria; infectious tuberculosis; plague; smallpox; yellow fever; viral hemorrhagic fevers; influenza caused by new or reemergent flu viruses that are causing, or have the potential
to cause, a pandemic; and severe acute respiratory syndromes (which may include COVID19).
214.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905); see also Polly J. Price, Quarantine and Liability in the Context of Ebola, 131 PUB. HEALTH REP. 500, 502 (2016).
215.
World Health Org. [“WHO”], Considerations for Quarantine of Individuals in the
Context of Containment for Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), at 1–2, WHO/2019nCoV/IHR_Quarantine/2020.2 (Mar. 19, 2020).
216.
WHO Guidance on Human Rights and Involuntary Detention for XDR-TB Control,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 24, 2007), https://www.who.int/tb/features_archive/involuntary_
treatment/en/ (“Therefore, interference with freedom of movement when instituting quarantine
or isolation for a communicable disease such as MDR-TB and XDR-TB may be necessary for
the public good, and could be considered legitimate under international human rights law.
This must be viewed as a last resort and justified only after all voluntary measures to isolate
such a patient have failed.”) (italics in original).
217.
Updated WHO Recommendations for International Traffic in Relation to COVID19 Outbreak, WORLD HEALTH ORG., (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.who.int/newsroom/articles-detail/updated-who-recommendations-for-international-traffic-in-relation-tocovid-19-outbreak.
218.
Id.

Fall 2020]

Emergencies End Eventually

137

219

IHRs. Given the support for the IHRs in the WHO and the Siracusa Prin220
ciples, member states could find that travel bans fail to meet the principle
of necessity.
This analysis highlights the need for states to consult public health experts when pursuing the “public health” goals in the limitation clauses. We
suggest that rigorous legal analysis cannot be complete without collaboration between technical experts and domestic policymakers.

3. Proportionality
As with necessity, an assessment of proportionality is best guided by
public health and technical collaboration with policymakers. The Human
Rights Committee expands on the notion of proportionality in relation to
Article 12(3) stating:
Restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function;
they must be the least restrictive instrument among those that might
achieve the desired result; and they must be proportionate to the in221
terest to be protected.
In the event that states could show that international travel restrictions
are necessary, it will be difficult to show that they are the least restrictive
instrument. The WHO has offered guidance on less-restrictive alternatives,
including risk communication, surveillance, patient management, and
222
screening at ports of entry and exit.
223
In contrast, the WHO recommends using quarantines, which states
have implemented on various scales. China quarantined close to 60 million
people in a two-day effort to limit transmission from the city of Wuhan in
224
Hubei province. Italy took a different approach by progressively expanding quarantine from ten towns in Lombardy and one in Veneto to the entire
225
country. Meanwhile, in the United States, a letter from 800 public health
and legal experts called for voluntary self-isolation measures in combination
with education, widespread testing, and universal access to treatment, stat219.
Roojin Habibi, Gian Luca Burci, Thana C. de Campos, Danwood Chirwa, Margherita Cina, Stephanie Dagron, Mark Eccleston-Turner, Lisa Forman, Lawrence O. Gostin,
Benjamin Mason Meier, Stefania Negri, Gorik Ooms, Sharifah Sekalala, Allyn Taylor, Alicia
Ely Yamin & Steven J. Hoffman, Commentary, Do Not Violate the International Health Regulations During the COVID-19 Outbreak, 395 LANCET, 664, 664 (2020).
220.
Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, at § I.B.iv.
221.
See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 12(3).
222.
Habibi et al., supra note 219.
223.
See generally World Health Org. supra note 215.
224.
Amy Qin, China May Be Beating the Coronavirus, at a Painful Cost, N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/07/world/asia/china-coronavirus-cost.html.
225.
Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 Response, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (Mar. 19,
2020) https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/19/human-rights-dimensions-covid-19-response.

138

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 42:105

ing they “are more likely to induce cooperation and protect public trust than
coercive measures and are more likely to prevent attempts to avoid contact
226
with the healthcare system.” The WHO recommends that contacts of pa227
tients with laboratory-confirmed results be quarantined for 14 days. This
containment strategy assumes rapid identification through laboratory test228
ing, a capacity which not all states have met. As such, an assessment of
whether quarantine constitutes “least restrictive means” must be tailored to
the region’s circumstances. For example, taking into account factors like
geographic scope, healthcare infrastructure, testing capacity, the phase of
the pandemic, and public compliance with other prevention measures are
relevant to the assessment of what constitutes “least restrictive means.” In
addition, the assessment should involve consultation with technical and
health professionals based on up-to-date scientific information.
Beyond the scope of the quarantine and travel restrictions, we suggest
that a proportionality assessment also should consider a limitation’s time
frame. When states act under a limitation clause to restrict rights, the ICCPR
has no explicit requirement that the restriction be time-limited and removed
229
or reviewed after a certain time period, unlike for derogations. This is a
major shortcoming of using a limitation analysis during an emergency. The
proportionality prong of a limitation analysis is the best place to capture this
time factor. Because the COVID-19 emergency is not static, the assessment
of proportionality and appropriateness of emergency measures will change
as the situation progresses. For example, Croatia’s decision prohibiting individuals from leaving home without a special permit is only in effect for
230
thirty days. In contrast, Jordan’s movement restrictions are in place “until
231
further notice.” We do not categorically suggest states must include time
limits in their emergency measures to be proportionate, but recommend time
limits because they are an additional safeguard that states will review the
proportionality of their COVID-19 response measures as the situation
changes. If states proceed under a limitations analysis, including a timelimit or a mechanism to trigger a later review of the emergency measures is

226.
Open Letter to Vice President Mike Pence, and Other Federal, State, and Local
Leaders from Public Health and Legal Experts in the United States, Achieving a Fair and Effective COVID-19 Response, (Mar. 6, 2020) (on file with Yale Law School),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/march6_2020_final_covid19_letter_from_public_health_and_legal_experts_2.pdf.
227.
World Health Org., supra note 215, at 2.
228.
Id.
229.
See McGoldrick supra, note 25, at 383 (stating limitations may be permanent).
230.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Croatia”) (stating “[t]he decision prohibits individuals from leaving their place of residence without a special permit, to be issued for very limited cases. The decision is in effect for 30 days.”).
231.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Jordan”) (stating “[i]t is forbidden to move and roam people in All regions of the Kingdom, starting from
seven in the morning on Saturday, 3/21/2020 until further notice.”).
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vital to guarantee that restrictions do not remain in place beyond the emergency and that human rights are ultimately restored upon the emergency’s
end.

4. Non-discrimination
No limitation of the rights contained in the ICCPR may be imposed for
232
a discriminatory purpose or applied in a discriminatory manner. Article
2(1) stipulates that any limitation must ensure that the rights of the Covenant are applied “without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop233
erty, birth or other status.” However, differential treatment is allowed under the Covenant if the goal is to achieve a legitimate purpose, and the criteria for such differentiation are reasonableness and objectiveness of the
234
measure are met.
Several member states have limited freedom of movement based on
235
age. Turkey restricts those over sixty-five from leaving their residence,
while Bosnia and Herzegovina’s order bans movement by citizens younger
236
than eighteen and older than sixty-five. Bulgaria takes a slightly different
approach, restricting persons under sixty from visiting shops or pharmacies
237
between 8:30 AM and 10:30 AM, while Uzbekistan limits persons older
than sixty-five from leaving their homes except to visit pharmacies or gro238
cery stores. Despite creating restrictions that distinguish based on age,
these types of limitations likely do not run afoul of the non-discrimination
principle.
While age is not one of the listed protected statuses in Article 2(1), the
Human Rights Committee has found that age is encompassed by the “any
239
other status” provision. However, states may be able to justify age differentiation based on the legitimate aim of public health. Available data suggests that older individuals are more likely to experience serious and life-

232.
General Comment No. 22, supra note 64, ¶ 8.
233.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2(1).
234.
General Comment No. 18, supra note 96, para. 13.
235.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Turkey”)
236.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Bosnia Herzegovina”). On April 3, the government revised the rule to allow older people to go out between
7 AM and noon, Monday through Friday.
237.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Bulgaria”).
238.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Uzbekistan”).
239.
See SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY (2nd
ed, 2004), ¶¶ 23.25–23.29 (citing Schmitz-de-Jong v. Netherlands, Communication No
855/1999 (July 16, 2001) and Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], Love v. Australia, Communication No. 983/2001 (Mar. 25, 2003).
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240

threatening responses to COVID-19. Governments have an interest in
avoiding infection of this highly susceptible population, to save lives, and to
conserve treatment resources. In Love v. Australia, the Human Rights
Committee found that imposing mandatory retirement for pilots at age sixty
did not violate the non-discrimination principle because the widespread national and international practice at the time, of mandatory retirement at age
241
sixty, suggested the differentiation was objective and reasonable. Likewise, in the case of COVID-19, many states deploy age-related restrictions
backed by data showing a correlation between the age of the person infected
242
and the rate of morbidity and mortality. However, states still need to analyze whether these limitations comply with other requirements of the
ICCPR, especially whether they constitute the least restrictive means.
In other instances, member states have passed facially neutral restrictions but implemented them in a discriminatory manner. In Australia,
reports claim that Indigenous and migrant communities have been disproportionately targeted by police enforcing COVID-related movement re243
strictions. In Bulgaria, checkpoint controls went into effect against two
244
Sofia neighborhoods largely composed of the Roma community. Both
Australia and Bulgaria’s implementation of the limitations discriminates
against groups protected by Article 2(1). So, while protecting public health
meets the legitimate purpose test, states must also justify that their “criteria
245
for such differentiation is reasonable and objective.” Given the historical
use of public health policy to discriminate against marginalized communi246
ties, states should support any differential treatment with scientific evidence and show that they meet the other requirements of the ICCPR.
240.
See Groups at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (May 14, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extraprecautions/groups-at-higher-risk.html (the CDC defines this group as people over 65).
241.
See Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], Love v. Australia, Communication No.
983/2001, ¶ 8.3 (Mar. 25, 2003).
242.
See e.g., COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Uzbekistan”). The Uzbekistani order restricts persons over sixty-five from leaving their homes noting
that the elderly have made up the majority of COVID-19 deaths worldwide.
243.
See Osman Faruqi, Compliance Fines Under the Microscope, SATURDAY PAPER,
(Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/health/2020/04/18/compliancefines-under-the-microscope/15871320009710.
244.
Rights Group Criticises Quarantine of Roma Settlements in Bulgaria and Slovakia,
REUTERS, (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-bulgariaslovakia/rights-group-criticises-quarantine-of-roma-settlements-in-bulgaria-and-slovakiaidUSL5N2C90TW.
245.
General Comment No. 18, supra note 96, ¶ 13.
246.
See e.g., Weijun Yu and Jessica Keralis, Controlling COVID-19: The Folly of International Travel Restrictions, HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 1 (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://www.hhrjournal.org/2020/04/controlling-covid-19-the-folly-of-international-travelrestrictions/#_edn5 (citing Joseph J. Amon & Katherine Wiltenburg Todrys, Fear of Foreigners: HIV-Related Restrictions on Entry, Stay, and Residence, 11 J. INT’L AIDS SOC. 8
(2008)).
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5. In a Democratic Society
While the ICCPR text does not require that restrictions on freedom of
movement qualify as necessary in a democratic society, General Comment
27 explicitly extends this requirement to freedom of movement limita247
tions. We explore this requirement in more detail in Section IV below,
particularly as it relates to elections and other forms of democratic protest.

B. Freedom of Movement Restriction Under Article 12(4)
Article 12(4), regarding the right to enter one’s own country, is not subject to the same limitation clause found in Article 12(3). Instead, this article
is written with the blanket prohibition stating, “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
248
deprived.” The Human Rights Committee has stated in General Comment
27 that “there are few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the
249
right to enter one’s own country could be reasonable.” Nonetheless, the
phrase “one’s own country” leaves room for interpretation. The burden is on
the alleged victim to show that a State is their “own country” conferring
250
rights under Article 12(4). Additionally, citizenship alone may not be determinative of one’s own country in the context of Article 12(4) without a
251
real connection to the country. As such, while the right appears absolute, it
is subject to defining the right holder’s “own country.” Notwithstanding this
question, any COVID-19 restriction, such as closing borders, that does not
allow individuals to return to their “own country” would be overbroad and
incompatible with the ICCPR.

V. A LIMITATIONS ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL COVID-19 SURVEILLANCE
AND ITS IMPACT ON PRIVACY
Another critical tool states are deploying to address COVID-19 involves digital surveillance. We consider in this section how digital tools for
combatting COVID-19 fare under a rigorous limitations analysis of the limited right to avoid “arbitrary and unlawful interference” with privacy under
Article 17 of the ICCPR. This section also catalogs many digital surveillance tools and related applications being deployed against COVID-19 and
analyzes their characteristics using a limitations analysis.
Considering whether the broad use of digital surveillance and enforcement tools against COVID-19 is justified under the standards of legality,

247.
General Comment No. 27, supra note 48, ¶ 11 (applying the “in a democratic society” standard to art. 12(3)).
248.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 12(4).
249.
General Comment No. 27, supra note 48, ¶ 21.
250.
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF EXPULSION AND EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED
KINGDOM 47–48 (Eric Fripp, Rowena Moffatt & Ellis Wilford eds., 2015).
251.
Id. at 48.
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necessity, and proportionality and non-discrimination outlined above is an
important starting point for a rigorous limitations analysis. The legality test
is largely met when digital tools are authorized by properly passed law and
regulation, but with edicts requiring the use of digital surveillance apps emanating from a range of authorities—including workplaces, security and
health ministries, and state governments—it is unclear whether all have
been authorized or required by law. In considering necessity and proportionality, we must first consider specifically whether digital surveillance
tools produce an “arbitrary” invasion of privacy, as this is a threshold ques253
tion for determining whether any violation of Article 17 has occurred. In
many ways, arbitrariness is linked to necessity and proportionality. Thus we
examine those factors in combination. Finally, we address whether failure to
protect private data, after it has been digitally collected to combat COVID19, might produce an additional privacy violation. We review developing
standards related to a right of data protection and note that privacy violations could result from problems with data storage, transfer, and lack of
consent, if, for example, COVID-19 surveillance data was inappropriately
shared with the public or law enforcement agencies. We conclude with recommendations to better protect privacy during the pandemic, including a
call for better coordination of the legal, health, and technical communities in
deploying privacy-protecting technologies in COVID-19 surveillance and
response.

A. Violations of Privacy Rights Through Digital Surveillance and
Collection
1. Comparison of Practice: South Korea and Switzerland
Several countries have determined that cellphone location records pro254
vide powerful tools for enforcement of COVID-19-related restrictions.
South Korea and Switzerland were among the first countries to deploy digital apps and use mobile phone location information for purposes of COVID255
19-related contact tracing and monitoring. South Korea uses cellphone data to determine where individuals have been, to trace contacts of those exposed or suspected of exposure to the virus, and to enforce adherence to

252.
See infra Part V.A.3 for an explanation of the legality, necessity, and proportionality standard regarding Article 17.
253.
Matisse Barbaro, Government Interference with the Right to Privacy, 6 CAN. J.
HUM. RTS. 127, 128–29 (2017) (arguing that “non-arbitrary” surveillance is reasonable and
proportional under the circumstances).
254.
See Isobel Asher Hamilton, Compulsory Selfies and Contact-Tracing: Authorities
Everywhere are Using Smartphones to Track the Coronavirus, and It’s Part of a Massive Increase in Global Surveillance, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.business
insider.com/countries-tracking-citizens-phones-coronavirus-2020-3?r=US&IR=T .
255.
Id. (describing policies in South Korea); infra note 268 (describing policies in
Switzerland).
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256

quarantines and stay-at-home orders. South Korea permits relatively
257
broad surveillance under its national laws. South Korea changed its legal
framework after the MERS health scare in 2015 to allow the government to
gather and centrally control data from users’ cellphone locations that were
258
previously privacy protected. Now South Koreans are questioning wheth259
er too much information is being revealed in the course of contact tracing.
Among recent examples, revealing people’s late-night whereabouts in gay
bars and publicly identifying visitors to so-called “love motels” has raised
260
questions about privacy and adultery. In explaining contact tracing
measures, an official at the Korea Centers for Disease Control said the government starts with patient interviews but adds to the picture by using “GPS
data, surveillance camera footage, and credit card transactions to recreate
261
their route a day before their symptoms showed.” Some have suggested
South Korea’s public disclosure of infected people’s locations violates nondiscrimination protections, given a May case in which a patron visiting gay
262
nightclubs was outed as a source of new infections. In contrast to these
broad laws permitting electronic medical surveillance, telemedicine remains
263
illegal in South Korea.
In Switzerland, authorities are using group data from mobile telephone
carrier Swisscom to determine compliance with a national order limiting the
264
size of public gatherings. According to the Federal Office of Public
Health, Swisscom has provided analysis to the Swiss government about sit265
uations in which twenty or more cellphone users are gathered. The data
indicates that far fewer Swisscom users are moving or gathering in large

256.
See Hyung Eun Kim, Coronavirus and Privacy: Are South Korea’s Alerts Too Revealing? BBC (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51733145; c.f. David
Argente, The Costs of Privacy (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27220, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27220.pdf (illustrating the amount of detail shown by South
Korean text alerts related to COVID contact tracing apps).
257.
See Suk T. Lee, South Korea: Implementation and Application of Human Rights
Covenants, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 705, 712–16 (1993).
258.
See Kim, supra note 256; Steven Borowiec, How South Korea’s Nightclub Outbreak is Shining an Unwelcome Spotlight on the LGBT Community, TIME (May 14, 2020),
https://time.com/5836699/south-korea-coronavirus-lgbtq-itaewon/.
259.
Kim, supra note 256.
260.
Id.
261.
Id.
262.
Don’t Rely on Contact-Tracing Apps, ECONOMIST (May 16, 2020),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/05/16/dont-rely-on-contact-tracing-apps.
263.
Telemedicine Remains Illegal in South Korea, KOREA ECON. INST. AMERICA: THE
PENINSULA, (May 15, 2020), http://blog.keia.org/2020/05/telemedicine-still-illegal-southkorea/.
264.
New Coronavirus: Evaluation of Anonymised Data on Gatherings, SWITZ. FED.
OFF.. PUB. HEALTH, (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.bag.admin.ch/bag/en/home/dasbag/aktuell/news/news-26-03-2020.html.
265.
Id.

144

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 42:105
266

groups after the Swiss government limited the size of gatherings. At the
same time, the Swiss government took pains to emphasize that it was protecting data privacy and time-limiting its use of the information:
At no point do we receive location data from Swisscom, merely
analyses and visualisations that Swisscom can generate from that
data. The provisions of the Data Protection Act and the ethical
principles that Swisscom follow in processing data are fully respected. As soon as COVID-19 Ordinance 2 is abrogated, we will
not be provided with any further analyses.
Swisscom’s Mobility Insights platform (based on Art. 45b of Telecommunications Act) shows the approximate movements of all
SIM cards in a given area (e.g. a cantons) over a certain time period. The analyses are based on approximate location details from the
267
previous 24-hour period.
In response to privacy-related concerns, the Swiss health authorities updated the information provided to the public, noting that the app “does not
record data,” it works on a decentralized basis, “is designed to ensure ano268
nymity, and “meets the highest privacy protection requirements.”

2. Legality Suffers When States Rush to Adopt Digital
Surveillance Apps
In both Switzerland and South Korea, the use of digital applications
269
stemmed from legislative action where laws or regulations were adopted.
But for most states, the rush to adopt digital surveillance apps in response to
COVID-19 feels like a free-for-all. Six months into the pandemic, at least
thirty-seven states mandated digital applications or other surveillance for
some locations or parts of their populations, such as those under quarantine;
other states have encouraged the use of digital applications for COVID-19
270
surveillance on a voluntary basis. The distinction between voluntary and

266.
Id.
267.
Id.
268.
New Coronavirus: SwissCovid App and Contact Tracing, SWITZ. FED. OFF. PUB.
HEALTH (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.bag.admin.ch/bag/en/home/krankheiten/ausbruecheepidemien-pandemien/aktuelle-ausbrueche-epidemien/novel-cov/swisscovid-app-und-contacttracing.html.
269.
See Kim, supra note 256 (discussing South Korea); Evaluation of Anonymised Data
on Gatherings, supra note 264 (discussing Switzerland); see also infra Part IV.A.1 for a discussion evaluating emergency measures under the ICCPR’s legality standard.
270.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (effective September 2020, “states” as defined by the Tracker deploying surveillance include Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,
Bulgaria, Brazil (city of Recife only), Cambodia, China, Ecuador, Grenada, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lichtenstein, Mexico, Montenegro, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore,
South Africa, State of Palestine, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom).
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mandatory use of digital applications has been blurred by mandates from
employers, local governments, and other authorities, raising questions about
271
the legality of required use of digital apps.
Numerous European states started to employ telecom provider data to
enforce their social distancing regulations early in their responses to
272
COVID-19. In addition, within twenty-four hours of it being offered,
more than one million users in Australia downloaded a government-run surveillance app using Bluetooth to monitor locations of those who had tested
273
positive and trace their contacts. The government has promised to stop using the app and wipe users’ personal data when the COVID-19 crisis
274
ends. While intrusive, these applications are examples of measures to
combat COVID-19 that users voluntarily accept and that meet the legality
standard.
Other states have failed to follow their own legal and regulatory procedures in mandating citizens use digital applications or in authorizing telephone companies to provide to the state information to monitor and enforce
COVID-19-related quarantines, stay-at-home orders, and contact restrictions. Kazakhstan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, for example,
have adopted mandatory use of digital applications for quarantine enforce275
ment without a clear legal basis. In some countries, including India, voluntary apps have been made mandatory for public employees or imposed as
conditions for returning to work, sometimes without a legal basis for such
276
conditions. While the use of a mobile surveillance application in Israel
was lawful according to emergency regulations, Israel’s Supreme Court
ruled in April 2020 that the program of surveillance developed by the nation’s internal security organization could not extend beyond May 1st with271.
See, e.g., New Guidelines on the measure to be taken by Ministries/Department of
the Government of India, State/UT Government and State/UT authorities for the containment
of COVID-19 in the country for an extended period of the National Lockdown for a further
period of two weeks with effect from May 4, 2020. Order, No. 40-3/2020-DM-i(A) (May 1,
2020) (India) [hereinafter India Order].
272.
See Catherine Stupp, Europe Tracks Residents’ Phones for Coronavirus Research,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/europe-tracks-residents-phonesfor-coronavirus-research-11585301401.
273.
See A. Odysseus Patrick, Australians Toss Aside Privacy Concerns in Rush to Sign
up for Virus Tracking Phone App, WASH. POST, (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/world/asia_pacific/australians-toss-aside-privacy-concerns-in-rush-to-sign-up-forvirus-tracking-phone-app/2020/04/29/9a67ae88-89dd-11ea-80df-d24b35a568ae_story.html.
274.
Id.
275.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1; L. Libr. Cong, LL File No. 2020-019000,
Regulating Electronic Means to Fight the Spread of COVID-19 163–64, 204 (2020); New
‘Stay Home’ App Launched by DoH to Reinforce Self-Quarantine Procedures, Emirates News
Agency (March 4, 2020), https://wam.ae/en/details/1395302834693. See also Mobile Location
Data and COVID-19: Q&A, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (May 13, 2020), https://www.hrw.org
/news/2020/05/13/mobile-location-data-and-covid-19-qa.
276.
See, e.g., Mobile Location Data and COVID-19: Q&A supra note 275; see also India Order supra note 271.
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277

out parliamentary approval. The Court held that the executive branch
278
could not legally extend the extensive surveillance program. Ultimately
following standards for legality, Israel’s parliament approved the program in
May, allowed it to lapse, and then restarted digital surveillance in July after
279
a new outbreak. The surveillance today remains in place, with a parlia280
mentary imposed time limit at year’s end.

3. Necessity and Proportionality in the Context of Avoiding Arbitrary
Interference with Privacy
Even in states that have taken precautions and used legislation or
properly adopted regulations to impose digital health surveillance tools, the
risks of overreach and long-standing damage to privacy rights remain of
concern. To determine whether, on balance, a state’s measures that infringe
on privacy are permissible, we have to first determine if Article 17’s limited
right to freedom from “unlawful and arbitrary” interference with privacy has
been triggered. This query, however, throws us almost immediately back to
considering the secondary tests of necessity and proportionality.
Arbitrariness can be considered an element of a proportionality analysis
as it centers on the link between the state’s reasoning for a restriction, the
scope of the restriction, and the reasonableness of the measure for fighting
281
COVID-19. Digital surveillance is, by its nature, broad and can encom282
pass actors or circumstances beyond the originally intended scope. In the
context of terrorist surveillance, commentators have argued that blanket
283
surveillance is inherently arbitrary. Even worse, information gathered
from surveillance is often transferred to police and other third parties, with

277.
See Fahim et al., supra note 267.
278.
Elena Chachko, The Israeli Supreme Court Checks COVID-19 Electronic Surveillance, LAWFARE, (May 5, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/israeli-supreme-court-checkscovid-19-electronic-surveillance.
279.
Craig Timberg, No Service: Cellphone Apps Designed to Track Covid-19 Spread
Struggle Worldwide Amid Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/08/17/covid-tracking-apps-cellphones/.
280.
Id.
281.
See Van Hulst v. the Netherlands, supra note 78; see also Barbaro, supra note 253,
at 129.
282.
See Coronavirus: States Use of Digital Surveillance Technologies to Fight Pandemic Must Respect Human Rights, ARTICLE19.ORG (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.article19.org
/resources/covid-19-states-use-of-digital-surveillance-technologies-to-fight-pandemic-mustrespect-human-rights/.
283.
See, e.g., Barbaro, supra note 253, at 149 (stating “[f]ifth, surveillance and other
measures that result in “blanket and indiscriminate” collection and storage of personal data
should be prohibited insofar as they must be conceived as disproportionate.”); Scheinin, supra
note 79, at para. 23 (stating “[t]he proportionality requirement in the limitations test to the
right to privacy raises questions whether blanket stop and search powers in designated security zones, such as in the Russian Federation or the United Kingdom, are really necessary in a
democratic society.”) [internal citations omitted].
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little regard for the user’s privacy or consent to the transfer. In the language of proportionality, digital surveillance is arbitrary when it is not nar285
rowly tailored to the specific COVID-19-related objective being pursued.
In evaluating whether COVID-19-related restrictions on privacy are
necessary, health authorities find different digital tools relatively more use286
ful at different phases of COVID-19 response. For example, when states
seek to flatten the curve and delay the spread of COVID-19, location data,
which can assist in determining adherence to social distancing policies, is
287
particularly useful. At other stages of response, knowledge of an infected
cellphone user’s proximity to others and details of whom she interacted with
288
becomes important to contact tracing. Sometimes analysis of anonymized
data can aid policymaking, while in other cases—such as contact tracing—
knowledge about a named individual’s location, movements, and identities
289
of those with whom the infected person came into contact are essential.
Thus, digital surveillance, in general, can be deemed necessary, but a more
precise analysis would show that only some types of digital surveillance are
necessary at corresponding phases of the pandemic.
With respect to proportionality, most essential data for combatting
COVID-19 can be gathered in an anonymous form or, even if a link to an
infected person is required, with applications that do not remove data from a
290
user’s cellphone. Moreover, once a national surveillance program begins
to collect mobile telephone data and location information, is it necessary to
supplement this data with additional privacy invasions from facial recognition artificial intelligence or credit card records, as in South Korea and
291
elsewhere? Bahrain, Jamaica, Kuwait, and Hong Kong require selfisolating individuals to wear electronic bracelets to ensure they stay close to
their mobile phone so as to enhance the effectiveness of mobile phone292
based surveillance. Oman and Tunisia have gone even farther, deploying
See infra Part VI. B.
See supra Part II.B.2.a.
Digital Contract Tracing Tools for COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Apr. 20, 2020) https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/digitalcontact-tracing.pdf.
287.
COVID-19 Response: Overview of Data and Technology, PRIVACY INT’L, (Apr. 1,
2020), https://privacyinternational.org/key-resources/3547/covid-19-response-overview-dataand-technology.
288.
Id.
289.
Id.
290.
See id. (explaining contact tracing).
291.
See COVID-19: The Surveillance Pandemic, INT’L CTR. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L.,
https://www.icnl.org/post/analysis/covid-19-the-surveillance-pandemic (last visited Sept. 28,
2020) (citing Park Eui-rae, Corona 19, Second Concern About Excessive Disclosure of Privacy, YONHAP NEWS (Mar. 9, 2020) https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200309089000004).
292.
IGA Begins Distribution of Electronic Bracelets Compatible with ‘BeAware’ App,
INFO. & E-GOV’T AUTH. NEWS (Apr. 4, 2020) http://www.iga.gov.bh/en/article/the-igabegins-distribution-of-electronic-bracelets-compatible-with-beaware-app (discussing electron284.
285.
286.
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drones and robots, respectively, to assist in COVID-19 monitoring and en293
forcement. Less restrictive alternatives to broad digital surveillance pro294
grams that would cause less damage to privacy are available. However
states are not using these less-restrictive solutions that protect private information. Rather, states are rushing to deploy new digital tools, often giving
themselves and their telecommunications companies blanket authorization
to collect and use cellphone users’ location data, proximity data and interac295
tion data, with little oversight. Thus, many digital surveillance tools used
for COVID-19 fail the proportionality test.
As examples, consider the following measures for contact tracing and
digital surveillance that are designed or are being deployed in arbitrary, unnecessary, or disproportionate ways. Cambodia’s April 10, 2020 State of
National Emergency authorizes measures including “mobilizing military
forces; surveilling telecommunications “by any means,” and banning or restricting news media that may harm “national security,” or create confusion
296
297
about the state of emergency.” China has deployed the Alipay Health
298
Code application in more than 200 cities. Alipay Health Code contains an
algorithm that analyzes a user’s data, including uploaded information and
information derived from locations and cellphone proximity to assign the
user with a color code (red, yellow, or green like a stoplight) indicating their
risk of COVID-19 transmission to others, and user data is shared with the
299
police. COVID-19 testing is not among the data the application can ac300
cess. Media reports say the app will soon be required nationwide in Chi-

ic monitoring bracelets in Bahrain); see also COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching
“surveillance” and “Hong Kong” or “Kuwait” or “Jamaica”).
293.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Oman” and “Tunisia”).
294.
See fns. 338–49.
295.
See COVID-19: The Surveillance Pandemic, supra note 291.
296.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Cambodia”); see also Rebecca
Ratcliffe, Fears as Cambodia Grants PM Vast Powers Under COVID-19 Pretext, GUARDIAN,
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/10/fears-as-cambodia-grantshun-sen-vast-power-under-covid-19-pretext.
297.
China has not ratified the ICCPR but has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights whose Article 12 protects privacy in terms similar to ICCPR Article 17. Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, UN Doc. A/RES/217(III) art. 12 (Dec.
10, 1948). For an argument why the ICCPR applies to surveillance by China, see James D.
Fry, Privacy, Predictability and Internet Surveillance in the U.S. and China: Better the Devil
You Know? 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 419, at 433–37 (2015).
298.
See Paul Mozur, Raymond Zhong & Aaron Krolik, In Coronavirus Fight, China
Gives Citizens a Color Code, With Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2020)
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html.
299.
See id.
300.
See Yuan Yang & Nian Liu, China, Coronavirus and Surveillance: The Messy Reality of Personal Data, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/760142e6740e-11ea-95fe-fcd274e920ca.
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301

na. Again, such a broad program that does not link to COVID-19-testing
data appears disproportionate to the privacy damage caused.
Democracies also are guilty of violating the proportionality test in their
zeal to adopt digital tools to combat COVID-19. The province of Western
Australia amended its Emergency Management Act, “allowing the government to install surveillance devices in homes and direct people to wear monitoring devices, in order to ensure that those required to quarantine do not
302
interact with the community.” South Korea’s aforementioned COVID-19
surveillance program has been questioned domestically because its use of
credit card records and closed-circuit television monitoring goes beyond the
303
mobile telephone surveillance authorized by law. Lichtenstein uses electronic bracelets to enhance its mobile surveillance app with data sent direct304
ly to the mobile provider Swisscom.

B. Privacy Violations from Failure to Protect Private
Health Data
Any balancing test must compare the intrusiveness of digital COVID19 surveillance with the extent of harm. So, in essence, how serious is the
damage to privacy from digital medical surveillance in response to the
COVID-19 emergency? In addition to the initial privacy intrusion occurring
when surveillance takes place, the data collected to combat COVID-19 is
often passed on to other government agencies, law enforcement, private insurance companies and the general public, usually without again seeking the
305
user’s explicit consent. UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and
Counterterrorism Martin Scheinin underscored that absent strict adherence
to ICCPR requirements of legality and time-limitation, COVID-19-related
surveillance measures could irreversibly damage privacy related to health
data:
Although privacy in principle is subject to a proportionality test also in normal times, it is in my view different from the first set of
rights just mentioned because of the risk of letting loose Orwellian
surveillance in respect of highly sensitive personal health data. The
306
risk of breaching the essential core of privacy rights is real.

301.
See Mozur et. al., supra note 298.
302.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (citing Emergency Management Amendment
(COVID-19 Response) Bill 2020 (WA) s 6 (Austl.)).
303.
COVID-19: The Surveillance Pandemic, supra note 291.
304.
COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Lichtenstein”).
305.
See id.; see also Wendy K. Mariner, Reconsidering Constitutional Protection for
Health Information Privacy, 18 J. CONST. L. 976, at 986–93 (2016).
306.
Martin Scheinin, COVID-19 Symposium: To Derogate or Not to Derogate?, OPINIO
JURIS (Apr. 6, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/06/covid-19-symposium-to-derogate-ornot-to-derogate.
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Another commentator has said that mass collection and analysis of data
“challenges international privacy laws in several ways: it casts doubt on the
distinction between personal and non-personal data, clashes with data min307
imization, and undermines informed choice.”

1. Overview of Health Data Protection Standards
In fleshing out the legal basis for a right to protection of private data,
the UN Special Rapporteur for the Protection of Human Rights While
Countering Terrorism reported to the United Nations that data protection
principles are “encapsulated in the right to privacy” under the Human
308
Rights Committee’s General Comment 16. Among the international core
data protection provisions, he identifies as encapsulated by the right to privacy are obligations for states to:
• Obtain personal information fairly and lawfully;
• Limit the scope of its use to the originally specified purpose;
• Ensure that the processing is adequate, relevant and not excessive;
• Ensure its accuracy;
• Keep it secure;
• Delete it when it is no longer required; and
• Grant individuals the right to access their information and re309
quest corrections.
Similar standards were set forth by the Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Privacy in his 2019 consultations to establish a Draft Recommendation
310
on the Protection of Health-Related Data. That recommendation, produced by a Task Force created by the Special Rapporteur, was designed to
establish “a common international baseline for minimum data protection
standards for health-related data for implementation at the domestic level,
and, to be a reference point for the ongoing debate on how the right to pri311
vacy can be protected in the context of health data.” Among the rights, the
Draft Recommendation sets forth with respect to health data are:

307.
Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning? 3 INT’L
DATA PRIV. L. 74, 74 (2013).
308.
Scheinin, supra note 79, ¶ 12 (citing Human Rights Committee General Comment
No. 16).
309.
Id. (citing Data Protection regulations of the Council of Europe, the OECD and the
UN General Assembly).
310.
See Mandate of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy,
Task Force on Privacy and the Protection of Health-Related Data, Draft Recommendation
on the Use of Health-Related Protection and Data, Third Draft for Consultation, (Nov.
2018), available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/SR_Privacy/Draft
RecommendationProtectionUseHealthRelatedData.pdf.
311.
Id. ¶ 1.2.
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•

A right to transparency in how, when and by whom one’s
312
health data is processed;
• Rights of access to, portability, rectification, erasure, and ob313
jection to the processing of health-related data;
• A right to informed consent prior to the processing or use of
314
their health-related data.
Failure to adhere to these obligations can damage privacy through an
inadequate focus on safe data storage, consent of users to use of their data,
and protecting transfer of data collected for health purposes to law enforce315
ment or third parties who may use it for other unintended purposes.
In the COVID-19 crisis, states have rushed to deploy digital surveillance so quickly that few of the data protection principles related to privacy
316
have been followed. Informed consent, for example, is not necessarily a
317
focus of COVID-19-related surveillance. Armenia passed a new law on
March 31, 2020, providing the government with broad powers to track citizens’ locations and movements using their cellphone data without the ex318
plicit permission of the person being monitored. Even where consent is
initially given, such as an individual voluntarily downloading a tracing app
at the height of COVID-19 spread, later transfer of the data can violate informed consent because the data passes on to a different user or for a different purpose.
According to WHO guidelines on ethical issues in public health surveillance, using unique anonymous identifiers and geo-masking are among the
safeguards that should be deployed to avoid harm from public health sur319
veillance. Data collected in the name of public health should never be
shared for purposes unrelated to public health or for taking non-health ac320
tion against any person. In addition, the WHO advises that oversight is
key in the use of surveillance data, in collecting data that reveals stigma321
tized behavior and to maintain and preserve public trust. States should exert special caution regarding the transfer of data to law enforcement agen-

312.
Id. ¶ 11.
313.
Id. ¶ 12.
314.
Id. ¶ 5.1.a.
315.
Scheinin, supra note 79, ¶ 12 (citing General Comment No. 16).
316.
See infra Part V.A.2.
317.
See Kerstin Vokinger, Digital Health and the COVID-19 Epidemic: An Assessment
Framework for Apps from an Epidemiological and Legal Perspective, SWISS MEDICAL
WKLY. (May 17, 2020) https://smw.ch/article/doi/smw.2020.20282.
318.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Armenia”).
319.
WHO Guidelines on Ethical Issues in Public Health Surveillance, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (2017); Q&A: Ethics in Public Health Surveillance, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 2017),
http://www10.who.int/features/qa/surveillance-ethics/en/.
320.
Id.
321.
See id. at 27, 34, 37.
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322

cies. These WHO provisions also guide where and how a patient’s public
health data should be restored after an emergency has passed. For example,
the WHO calls for states to have a “compelling justification” for sharing
identifiable data for non-public health uses in the WHO guidelines raises the
specter that health, location, contacts or other surveillance data—once taken—will be used again by governments or remain in the public domain
323
where it can be exploited for other purposes.
It is no coincidence that counterterrorism surveillance provides one of
the best parallels for a rigorous analysis of how health surveillance violates
privacy. Governments often permit human rights infringements in response
324
to both health and security emergencies. Moreover, the combination of
disease and terrorism-related concerns has led law enforcement and other
security officials to gain broad access to massive health databases, which
often include data collected for medical surveillance:
Nonetheless, before September 11, 2001, public health agencies
had not persuaded the public to compel reporting of personally
identifiable health information for all these purposes. The five
deaths from anthrax letters sent in October 2001 fueled fears that
terrorists might use chemical or biological agents to attack the
United States. The SARS epidemic in 2003 revived fears of natural
epidemics. Both the possibility of bioterrorism and new natural epidemics like avian influenza inspired new legislation to collect vast
amounts of medical information in an attempt to detect cases in
time to prevent the further spread of disease. . . . Public sentiment
about providing personal information to the government or private
companies has appeared to whipsaw between support in the name
of preventing terrorism and opposition due to fears of government
invasions of privacy. . . New information technology encourages
both more surveillance and new uses for the data collected, from
changing the environment to changing individual behavior. Surveillance programs have traditionally been disease specific, but the present federal attention to terrorism has been encouraging coordinated
systems that link all types of health information in an electronic da325
tabase.

322.
See id. at 46.
323.
See id.
324.
Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and Medical Privacy, 87 B.U. L. REV. 347, 347 (2007) (quoting City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 271 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993)) [hereinafter Mariner, Mission Creep] (“The claim of ‘disease’ in a
domestic setting has the same kind of power as the claim of ‘national security’ in matters relating to foreign policy. Both claims are very powerful arguments for executive action. Both
claims are among those least likely to be questioned by any other branch of government and,
therefore, subject to abuse”).
325.
Id. at 356–58 (internal citations omitted).
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2. Data Collected From COVID-19 Surveillance Harms Privacy After
the Emergency Ends
As introduced above, a significant concern with COVID-19-inspired
health surveillance data is that even if an initial intrusion on privacy is justified on balance, the privacy violation does not end when the COVID-19related emergency ends. Absent rigorous data protection, the information
collected for stopping the spread of disease is likely to make its way into
other government, law enforcement, or third-party uses, without consent of
326
those being monitored. This risk of unauthorized transfer existed before
COVID-19’s outbreak but has expanded because of the rapid pace and
scope at which COVID-19 surveillance data is collected, processed, and
327
stored. In considering other aspects of health surveillance, information
initially collected to fight an epidemic is often later contained in databases
328
whose primary purpose is health and financial management or research.
Moreover, the initial reason for allowing interference with privacy (consent
of the patient or an overriding public health interest) has often changed or
eroded by the time the data is included in other, different, down-stream da329
tabases. A balancing analysis premised on avoiding arbitrary interference
with privacy will be hard-pressed to conclude that broad use of data without
sufficient safeguards is the least-restrictive alternative to achieve public
health goals.
How might this type of privacy infringement due to data collection and
storage have a practical impact with respect to COVID-19-inspired restrictions? A recent Human Rights Watch study indicated that the accumulation of large amounts of data by governments through COVID-19surveillance apps risks use of that data for repression:
Other concerns include: restricting people’s movements based on
arbitrary and opaque apps, as is the case in China; the lack of consent to data being used, as is the case in Armenia, Israel, and South

326.
See id, at 358–60, 369.
327.
See Wafa Ben-Hassine & Philip Dawson, 4 Rules to Stop Governments Misusing
COVID-19 Tech After the Crisis, WORLD ECON. F., (May 15, 2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/covid-19-tech-data-usage-privacy/.
328.
See Mariner, Mission Creep, supra note 324, at 358–60; see also Mariner, Reconsidering Constitutional Protection, supra note 305, at 986–93.
329.
Mariner, Mission Creep, supra note 324, at 384 ( “[c]ourts in cases like Whalen and
Danforth have limited their analyses to the justification for the initial collection of information
– the first level of surveillance. The laws at issue in these first-generation cases did not contemplate secondary or tertiary reporting; courts had no need to consider re-disclosures other
than accidental or negligent breaches of confidentiality at the first level. Yet it is the subsequent release of information to other public agencies and private entities that dominates the
structure of many current surveillance programs. Moreover, a program’s function can and often does change from level to level. If the different surveillance levels are not viewed independently, the public health purpose of the first level of reporting may be conflated with the
ultimate use of the data”).
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Korea; and the combination of mobile location data with other
types of data, such as facial recognition, as is the case in Moscow.
Almost all of the initiatives using location data to respond to
COVID-19 involve placing large collections of data in the hands of
governments, many of which have histories of repression and discrimination against already marginalized communities, including
religious minorities and political dissidents. Excessive interference
with location privacy is a gateway to undue restrictions on other
330
rights.
Other possibilities for unauthorized transfer of data or other violations
of data privacy arise from the role of tech giants in the creation of digital
331
apps to help track the spread of COVID-19. In Nigeria, for example, the
governors association has already initiated cooperation with the mobile telephone company to fight the pandemic that shares subscriber data unrelated
332
to COVID-19. Surveillance data could be coupled with other health information, for example information from fitness trackers in health apps, for
333
malign purposes. From such a starting point, it is not difficult to imagine
security agencies using smartphone heart and pulse trackers to determine if
suspected individuals show signs of nervousness and use that as a basis of
334
criminal suspicion, interrogation, or evasion of quarantine. Similarly, collection of location data, credit card information, and CCTV footage could
be combined with facial recognition and other artificial intelligence analysis
to reveal details of personal movements and habits unrelated to any health
335
interest.
Examples like Switzerland, where digital solutions to address COVID19 protect data privacy, constitute best practices and less restrictive means
336
as alternatives to digital surveillance infringements. Similarly, South Africa appears to have considered protecting privacy as part of a balancing
analysis in revising its COVID-related regulations. In April, it repealed and

330.
Mobile Location Data and COVID-19: Q&A, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (May 13, 2020,
12:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/13/mobile-location-data-and-covid-19-qa.
331.
See Abrar Al-Heeti, Snowden Warns Government Surveillance Amid COVID-19
Could be Long Lasting, CNET (Mar. 26, 2020 2:31 PM), https://www.cnet.com
/news/snowden-warns-government-surveillance-amid-covid-19-could-be-long-lasting/.
332.
COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Nigeria”).
333.
Id.
334.
See, e.g., COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (noting Iran’s mobile app claims to be
able to diagnose COVID-19 using technology similar to that in health applications); Hanna
Kozlowska, Our Obsession with Health-Tracking Technology is Great Evidence for Cops,
QUARTZ (Oct. 7, 2018), https://qz.com/1415879/our-obsession-with-health-trackingtechnology-is-great-evidence-for-cops/; Hamilton supra note 254.
335.
See, e.g., Eun A Jo, South Korea’s Experiment in Pandemic Surveillance,
DIPLOMAT (Apr. 13, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/south-koreas-experiment-inpandemic-surveillance/.
336.
New Coronavirus: Evaluation of Anonymised Data on Gatherings, supra note 264.
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revised regulations under its Disaster Management Act to create a national
COVID-19 Tracing Database which provides that data of contacts for all
who have a positive COVID-19 test must be anonymized within six weeks
337
of the end of the declared COVID Disaster. Under ICCPR standards for
proportionality, COVID-19-inspired restrictions that are not the least restrictive method for privacy infringement in use and handling of data fail a limitations or a derogation analysis. One significant reason is that data privacy
violations by their nature are likely to continue after the initial emergency,
and the initial reason for the data collection ends.

C. Technology Offers Less Intrusive COVID-19 Surveillance Measures
Today, technology offers states a range of less-intrusive health surveillance alternatives to address concerns about COVID-19-related data use,
storage and transfer policies, and issues of informed consent. These include:
• Using privacy-protecting technologies, such as randomization
of identifiers, secure hardware enclaves, secure multiparty
computations, differentiated privacy, and homomorphic en338
cryption,
• Tailoring the surveillance information collected to the appropriate phase of disease protection and prevention being em339
ployed at the time by public health authorities,
• Data security, retention, and auditing policies, including storing
data temporarily on the user’s phone or in anonymized or thirdparty applications instead of on government or telecommunica340
tions provider servers, and
• Ensuring consent of the user to any transfer of the data beyond
341
the initial purpose for which it was collected.
Moreover, a sophisticated merged understanding of technology, public
health, and the law is necessary to come up with new solutions that protect
337.
COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “South Africa).
338.
COVID-19: Using Mobile Phones & AI for Contact Tracing While Respecting Privacy, OTTER (Apr. 3, 2020, 10:06 AM), https://otter.ai/s/T_XbMSQ7SfGuG0dwXgX-TQ.
339.
As the pandemic becomes less localized with more community spread, different
information collection tools become more appropriate and individual information is less necessary, except for contact tracing of specific individuals. See e.g., Sera Whitelaw, Applications of Digital Technology in COVID-19 Pandemic Planning and Response, LANCET, (June
29,
2020),
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/landig/article/PIIS2589-7500(20)301424/fulltext. (exploring the various information collection tools being used at various phases of
pandemic preparedness and response). Yet others argue that location data of individual users
is important for effective contact tracing, even if it results in a privacy violation. See Timberg,
supra, note 279.
340.
See, e.g., New Coronavirus: Evaluation of Anonymised Data on Gatherings, supra
note 264.
341.
See, e.g., Ashkan Soltani et al., Contact Tracing Apps Are Not a Solution to the
COVID-19 Crisis, BROOKINGS (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream
/inaccurate-and-insecure-why-contact-tracing-apps-could-be-a-disaster/.
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privacy while providing health authorities with valuable data for stopping
epidemics like COVID-19. Governments, companies, and the tech community are working together to come up with ways to protect privacy while allowing data relevant to COVID-19 surveillance to be processed and used by
342
governments. But few measures deploy these safeguards. On the other
hand, states are rolling out new apps on an almost daily basis around the
world and giving themselves and their telecommunications companies authorization to collect and use cellphone users’ location data, proximity data
343
and interaction data, often without restriction.
The tech communities in Europe and the United States are pushing governments to include data protection technologies in their COVID-19 responses, including the Pan European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing
344
system. Among the technologies that are being deployed are randomization of identifiers, secure hardware enclaves, secure multiparty computa345
tions, differentiated privacy, and homomorphic encryption. Stakeholders
ranging from the UN’s International Telecommunications Union to the
World Economic Forum have proposed that privacy-enhancing technologies
should be used to prevent abuse of private data, which has been placed in
346
the hands of governments during the emergency response to COVID-19.
One widely discussed solution stems from a Google-Apple cooperation
project which uses Bluetooth in both Apple and Android cellphones to sup347
port contact-tracing. Unlike others, the Google-Apple collaboration saves
tracking information on a user’s phone, rather than on government-accessed
348
servers. This decentralized data storage better protects privacy and seems
to be a reasonable balance in line with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Six months into the pandemic, studies question whether any
contact tracing apps have helped to control the spread of the virus, but at
least those using the Google-Apple based technologies better protect priva349
cy.

342.
Id.
343.
See, e.g., id.
344.
COVID-19: Using Mobile Phones & AI for Contact Tracing While Respecting Privacy, supra note 338; see, e.g., Timberg, supra, note 279.
345.
See generally BIGDATA UN GLOB. WORKING GRP. UN HANDBOOK ON PRIVACYPRESERVING COMPUTATION TECHNIQUES, (2019), http://publications.officialstatistics.org
/handbooks/privacy-preserving-techniques-handbook/UN%20Handbook%20for%20PrivacyPreserving%20Techniques.pdf.
346.
Samantha Stein, How to Restore Data Privacy After the Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLD
ECON. F., (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/restore-data-privacyafter-coronavirus-pandemic/; Ben-Hassein, supra note 327.
347.
Some Countries Want Central Databases for Contact-Tracing Apps, ECONOMIST,
(Apr. 30, 2020) https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/04/30/some-countries-want-centraldatabases-for-contact-tracing-apps.
348.
Id.
349.
See Timberg, supra note 279.
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UN human rights monitors and interested civil society groups have offered interesting proposals to better protect privacy rights in the face of
modern surveillance and the spread of health data across uncontrolled databases. For example, a group of more than 100 civil society organizations
signed a joint statement April 2nd, calling on governments to ensure their
surveillance practices were strictly necessary and tailored to health needs
350
identified by public health professionals. Their joint statement proposed
seven preventive and protective measures for COVID-19-related surveillance. These include:
• Ensuring surveillance measures are lawful, necessary, and proportionate and provided for by law.
• Expanded surveillance powers should be time-limited and end
after the pandemic pressure decreases.
• Data collection should be used only for COVID-19 response
and no other government purpose.
• Digital safety and personal data must be protected in the process of pandemic response.
• Any use of digital surveillance or AI must address the risk that
marginalized populations are discriminated against or inaccurately characterized or targeted.
• Data sharing agreements that governments enter into must be
based on law and disclosed in a manner to allow public oversight, sunsetting, and other safeguards.
• Government should ensure that health authorities, not domestic
or international intelligence agencies, handle and control the information collected by COVID-19-related surveillance and effective remedies must exist for misuse and error.
• Public health experts and marginalized populations are among
the stakeholders that should be consulted in COVD-19 related
351
data collection and surveillance programs.
The difficulty of coordinating fast-moving technology changes for the
protection of privacy with the evolving responses of legal and health professionals in dealing with the virus is another significant reason why states
should consider COVID-19-related restrictions on privacy based on derogation from the ICCPR, rather than a limitations analysis. Our legal and health
framework would benefit from constant reassessment given the rapid
change in the scientific knowledge about the virus, its various stages, and
the best ways to combat the virus at each of these stages. Moreover, states
must have a sufficient understanding of the privacy-protecting technologies
available and must incentivize surveillance and digital app designers to pro-

350.
Joint Statement States Use of Digital Surveillance Technologies to Fight Pandemic
Must Respect Human Rights, ALGORITHM WATCH (Apr. 2, 2020), https://algorithmwatch.org
/en/joint-statement-pandemic-surveillance-tech-and-human-rights/.
351.
Id.
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tect privacy. A one-time limitations analysis that determines a privacy infringement caused by digital surveillance is permitted, because it was not
arbitrary under Article 17, threatens to be quickly out of date and does a disservice to the rapid advances in privacy-enhancing technology which can
permit strong digital responses to COVID-19 without infringing privacy
rights.

VI. IMPROVING LIMITATIONS ANALYSES OF COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS
ON FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
COVID-19-inspired restrictions on public gatherings, which in many
nations limit the number of individuals outside the same household who can
meet at one time or place, create interesting challenges under the ICCPR,
particularly under Article 21 on Freedom of Assembly. These limitations
impact public protests, church and other religious gatherings, opportunities
for political candidates to campaign, and for voters to cast ballots, cultural,
sports and recreational activities, and many other elements of social and political life. Many citizens seem to have accepted the balancing decision that
governments have made for them—agreeing to temporary limitations on
352
their exercise of rights in the interest of “preserving life.” In other cases,
citizens protest and vocally object to COVID-19-inspired restrictions and
demand a return to economic and social life without these public health
353
measures.
This section argues that analyses governments have undertaken with respect to freedom of assembly, if any, have been incomplete or insufficient,
and suggests additional factors states may use to conduct more thorough
limitations analyses. This section makes four primary points. First, a balancing between public health and other rights is clearly contemplated under Article 21, but states should not weigh all competing rights equally. The standard of the ICCPR prioritizes avoiding restrictions that impact a democratic
society. So, COVID-19-related restrictions that infringe political protests
and elections deserve more strict scrutiny than restrictions interfering with
sporting or cultural events. Second, governments should draw lessons from
European and U.S. legal doctrines, which emphasize that restrictions on assemblies should be viewpoint neutral and should maintain the ability of an
assembly to reach its intended audience. Third, modern society offers a
range of online alternatives, which could make restrictions more or less necessary and proportionate. States should explicitly consider the availability of

352.
See, e.g., Raphaella Stavrinou, Public Opinion in Italy, Spain, France in Favour of
Lockdown Measures, NEW EUR., (March 26, 2020, 6:56 PM), https://www.neweurope.eu
/article/public-opinion-in-italy-spain-france-in-favour-of-lockdown-measures; Ted Van Green
& Alec Tyson, Five Facts About Partisan Reaction To COVID-19 in the US, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(April 2, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/02/5-facts-about-partisanreactions-to-covid-19-in-the-u-s.
353.
See, e.g., infra fns. 409–416 (discussing Michigan protests).
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online alternatives, where relevant, and the impact of Internet shutdowns on
other freedoms during a pandemic. Finally, we conclude that a derogationsbased approach for justifying COVID-19-related restrictions on freedom of
assembly is preferable to a limitations-based one. All emergency restrictions
should eventually come to an end, an outcome more easily assured under a
derogations analysis than under a limitations analysis.

A. Limitations Analyses, If Any, Appear to Have Been Conducted
Superficially
According to the COVID-19 Tracker, at least 110 nations have imposed
354
freedom of assembly restrictions due to COVID-19 as of September 2020
Of those, ten percent involved legislation, with most other restrictions im355
posed by executive order or regulation. There is little evidence that officials analyzed the ICCPR standards of legality, necessity, and proportionali356
ty in detail in designing these restrictions. Despite the lack of evidence of
357
any rigorous analysis, we assume that the regulations of assemblies meet
the legality test and assume the responsible officials believed that some limit on public gatherings was necessary to protect the lives and capacity of
358
their health systems from the virus.
Assessing proportionality, however, is more complicated. The only UN
Special Rapporteur to formally report on health-based limitations on human
rights in pandemics since the COVID-19 outbreak essentially merged the
359
necessity and proportionality tests. He noted:
[U]nder the necessity principle, when a State invokes a legitimate
ground for restriction of freedom of expression, it must establish a
354.
COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1.
355.
Id. Cambodia, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greenland, Hungary, Ireland,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, N. Macedonia, South Korea, Singapore, and the United Kingdom
adopted national legislation, while Ethiopia and Nigeria imposed restrictions on assemblies
via legislation at state-level. Others in the database imposed restrictions based on executive
order, regulation, or practice. While not in the Tracker, Papua New Guinea also passed a law
giving the government Controller broad authority to restrict movement, assemblies and most
aspects of public life. See National Pandemic Act of 2020, Papua New Guinea National Parliament (June 12, 2020),
https://covid19.info.gov.pg/files/June2020/18062020/National
%20Pandemic%20Act%202020-%28Certified%29.pdf;
356.
See, e.g., Neil Jarman & Simona Ogenovska, Protest in Time of Pandemic, EUR.
CENT. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., (last accessed May 28, 2020), https://ecnl.org/protest-in-time-ofpandemic/ (arguing European assembly restrictions are haphazard with no standard for the
number of people permitted to gather or time-length of restrictions).
357.
See supra text accompanying fns. 66–70.
358.
COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Assemblies”).
359.
See, e.g., COVID-19 and Special Procedures, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS [“OHCHR”] (last visited May 29, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies
/SP/Pages/COVID-19-and-Special-Procedures.aspx (Special Rapporteur David Kaye was the
first UN Special Rapporteur to file a formal report related to the pandemic. Numerous rapporteurs have produced unofficial reports).
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direct and immediate connection between the expression and the
threat said to exist. It is the State’s obligation to demonstrate necessity, not a complainant’s obligation to demonstrate its failure. The
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights – that, to meet
the test of necessity, any restriction must be something more than
“useful,” “reasonable,” or “desirable”—is the correct one. Necessity implies proportionality, according to which restrictions must target a specific objective and not unduly intrude upon other rights of
targeted persons, and the ensuing interference with third parties’
rights must be limited and justified in the light of the interest supported by the intrusion (A/HRC/29/32, ¶ 35). The restriction must
be the least intrusive instrument among those which might achieve
360
the desired result.
We consider COVID-19-inspired assembly restrictions under these tests
below and suggest improvements for states to use in their balancing analyses.

B. A Rigorous Limitations Analysis Should Draw Lessons from Article
21, Jurisprudence on Protest Limitations, and Online Alternatives in
Modern Society
In considering restrictions on freedom of assembly, we suggest states
should, in the future, consider the following factors in assessing a restriction’s proportionality. First, ICCPR Article 21’s standard—that a restriction must be necessary in a democratic society—prioritizes certain
types of assemblies in balancing public health interests against human
rights. The ICCPR language suggests an intent to minimize limitation on
rights key to democratic expressions—such as those related to policy issues,
protest messages, and elections—over gatherings for sporting or cultural
361
purposes. Standards adopted by the General Comments and other second362
ary sources under-emphasize this link to democratic expression. In the
case of COVID-19-related restrictions, limitations that impact the rights
necessary for democratic expression should be strictly scrutinized. In effect,
this suggests that restrictions for public health may fail a limitations balancing analysis and would be better imposed as emergency derogations with
limited life-span.
Second, in a proper analysis of COVID-19-related restrictions, states
might consider the type of balancing European and U.S. law has applied to
freedom of assembly and public protest in a non-health context. In these ju-

360.
David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Disease Pandemics and the Freedom of Opinion and
Expression ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/49 (Apr. 23, 2020) (internal citations omitted).
361.
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 21.
362.
See General Comment No. 37, supra note 60, ¶ 40.
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risdictions, time, place, and manner restrictions are permitted in certain circumstances but must be applied to maximize the opportunity for the underlying message of an assembly to reach the intended audience—often lawmakers or other politicians. The Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (“OSCE”), for example, considers whether a protest is taking
place within sight and sound of the policymakers who are its intended audi363
ence. Finally, states should consider the availability of online alternatives
364
to assemblies that are important in a democracy. While this range of
online alternatives was unavailable when the ICCPR was drafted, any proportionality test applied today should consider the specific type and nature
of online alternatives, especially as they impact freedom of assembly.

1. “Necessary in A Democratic Society” From the ICCPR’s History
Analysis of bans on public gatherings and other COVID-19-inspired restrictions affecting freedom of assembly under IHRL is complicated by the
intention of drafters in the negotiating history of ICCPR Articles 21 and 22
requiring that any restriction be “necessary in a democratic society in the
365
interests of . . . public health.” It appears from the negotiating history of
the ICCPR that the point inserted into the Covenant by the states advocating
for restrictions to be “necessary in a democratic society” was more a political point about the link between assembly related rights and democratic activity than a legal one. The Travaux Préparatoires state:
Article 17 (Right of peaceful assembly) Formulation of the right.
The debate on article 15 that took place at the Commission’s 325th
meeting was concerned with the purposes of, and limitations on, the
right of peaceful assembly. Many representatives regarded the second sentence of the article as a satisfactory specification of the
limitations that were desirable. Some representatives thought there
was room for improvement and suggested the revision of the catalogue of limitations by adding public safety, public health instead
of health simply the prevention of disorder or crime, and the
maintenance of order, as some of the criteria by which the necessity
of allowable legislative limitations should be judged. A number of
representatives said it was of fundamental importance that limita-

363.
See Nina Belyaeva, Thomas Bull, David Goldberger, Michael Hamilton, Neil Jarman, Muatar S. Khaidarova, Sergei Ostaf, Vardan Poghosyan, Alexander Vashkevich &
Yevgeniy Zhovtis (Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe Panel of Experts on
nd
Freedom of Assembly), Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (2 ed., 2010) [hereinafter Freedom of Peaceful Assembly], at 17 § 3.4-3.5. infra text accompanying fns. 402–405
(discussing U.S. standards for time, place, and manner restrictions.
364.
See generally Amy E. Cattle, Digital Tahrir Square: An Analysis of Human Rights
and the Internet Examined Through the Lens of the Egyptian Arab Spring, 26 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 417, 449 (2016).
365.
ICCPR, supra note 4 at art. 21–22.
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tions on the right to peaceful assembly should be allowed only
where they were necessary in a democratic society. Other representatives contended that the right itself should serve the interests
of democracy and that any exercise of the right running counter to
democratic principles should be prohibited and penalized. The proponents of that view argued that the aim should meet with universal
approval among the members of the Commission and also that it
was consonant with the very principles and purposes of the United
Nations. Some representatives, however, opposed the linking either
of the right of peaceful assembly or of the limitations thereon to
democratic principles, since it was difficult to find any practical
definition of the term “democracy” that would meet with universal
acceptance and, furthermore, since none of the limitations in the
covenant should be used for the extirpation of any philosophies or
political beliefs, however detestable or obnoxious they might be,
unless the exercise of the right of peaceful assembly by groups
366
avowing such.
This discussion in the Travaux Préparatoires suggests that state representatives highly valued the connection between the right to peaceful assembly and democratic expressions of political views. They specified that
the ICCPR should not permit limitations that impede assemblies important
to a democracy. The political nature of this argument is enhanced by the fact
that language about limitations on freedom of assembly being necessary in a
democratic society was added to the ICCPR Article by the narrowest of
367
margins in a nine to eight vote, which split on ideological lines.
In attempting to interpret the “necessary in a democratic society” clause
of the ICCPR, some secondary sources oversimplified the political point being emphasized by the drafters. Clearly, an ideological battle between democracy and other forms of government was underway in 1966 when the
ICCPR was adopted. Proponents of democracy had prevailed in World War
II and held the majority in the UN at the time of the ICCPR vote, but the
368
Cold War-era blocs had formed. Democratic states largely supported the
ICCPR, while those in the Soviet-bloc supported the ICESCR, and nonaligned states like India and Yugoslavia supported elements of both trea-

366.
Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 63, paras. 21–22.
367.
Id. The insertion of the words “in a democratic society,” proposed by France
(E/CN.4/L.201), was adopted 9 to 8, with 1 abstention.
368.
See Nico Schrijver, Fifty Years International Human Rights Covenants. Improving
the Global Protection of Human Rights by Bridging the Gap Between the Two Covenants,
41TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS [TVR] 457, 458 (2016); Daniel Tarantola, A
Perspective on the History of Health and Human Rights: From the Cold War to the Gold War,
29 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y, 42, 42-53. (discussing right to health in ideological context of Cold
War).
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369

ties. In the context of the ICCPR discussion of the term “necessary in a
democratic society,” these non-aligned states assiduously abstained and ar370
gued that democracy was not sufficiently well defined. But that position
was defeated in the final vote on the article, and again in the amendment, as
371
the position of democratic states in the Western bloc prevailed.
Finally, in considering the standard for deciding whether a restriction is
“necessary in a democratic society,” the UN Human Rights Committee’s
General Comment 37 suggests that a limitation on freedom of assembly un372
der Article 21 must, inter alia:
• Be considered imperative, in the context of a society based on
democracy, political pluralism, and human rights, as opposed
to being merely reasonable or expedient;
• Be the least intrusive among the measures that might serve the
relevant protective function. Establishing whether a restriction
is necessary requires a factual assessment;
• Be proportionate, which requires . . . balancing the nature and
the extent of the interference against the reason for interfering.
This approach substitutes for the “necessary in a democratic society”
standard legal tests of proportionality and least restrictive means, which
were not necessarily intended in negotiating the ICCPR. Viewed in this
light, it appears the first test proposed by the General Comment—whether a
limitation is “considered imperative, in the context of a society based on
democracy, political pluralism, and human rights”—is the most consistent
with the underlying view of states negotiating the treaty. It is also the most
closely linked to the language of Article 21.

369.
Schrijver supra note 368; see also THE HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS AT 50 23-26
(Daniel Moeckli & Helen Keller eds., 2018).
370.
See Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 63, at paras. 249–50. (Some representatives,
however, opposed the linking either of the right of peaceful assembly or of the limitations
thereon to democratic principles, since it was difficult to find any practical definition of the
term “democracy” that would meet with universal acceptance and, furthermore, since none of
the limitations in the covenant should be used for the extirpation of any philosophies or political beliefs, however detestable or obnoxious they might be, unless the exercise of the right of
peaceful assembly by groups avowing such philosophies fell unmistakenly within one of the
types of activity that the State would be permitted, under the statement of limitations already
contained in the article, to prohibit or restrain. In favor: Egypt, Pakistan, Poland, Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay. Against: Australia,
Belgium, Chile, China, France, Greece, Lebanon, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Abstaining: India, Yugoslavia.”) (emphasis
added).
371.
Id.
372.
General Comment No. 37, supra note 60, ¶ 40.
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2. Impact of COVID-19-Related Restrictions on Rights Necessary to
Democracy
Analyzing whether a given restriction is necessary and justified in a
democratic society inherently poses its own balancing test based on the facts
of the restriction and the application of that restriction to assemblies, which
are expressing various viewpoints and opinions of relevance to democratic
373
debate. The “proportionality” analysis advanced by secondary sources
such as the Siracusa principles suggests analyzing a restriction by focusing
on the objective being sought to protect through the restriction—here, the
benefit to public health. In the case of COVID-19 related restrictions on
freedom of assembly, large gatherings could rationally impact public
374
health. But the original terms of the ICCPR and its history suggest that the
Covenant and Article 21, in particular, focused on how a given legal re375
striction would impact rights central to a democracy. In this way, the
ICCPR prioritizes certain rights as having greater weight than others in a
proper balancing analysis.
How would this apply in practice? The lawfulness of COVID-19 response measures depends on many factual questions about how the restriction was adopted, how it is being deployed, and what activity is being
limited. Is the restriction being deployed on a neutral basis across the board,
or is freedom of assembly or other political activity specifically targeted by
376
the limitation? For example, is the restriction being deployed, as it poten377
tially was in Poland, to limit participation in an election? Is it being deployed to limit the ability of protesters to complain about a political issue?
Is it, as in recent protests in the United States, part of a debate about the im378
pact of COVID-19-inspired restrictions themselves? Can bans on public
gatherings deny the right to work, or similarly, can they keep workers from
striking over, for example, inadequate protective gear or failure to grant
premium pay to healthcare workers treating those with the virus? What if
the ban is being deployed to limit another protected ICCPR right, such as
religious freedom? Or is it deployed as a pretext to push demonstrators off
the streets? In balancing the extent of a state’s interest in the protection of

373.
See S. Bay Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–14 (2020) (Roberts concurring) (emphasized the judiciary lacks the background, competence and expertise to
second-guess public health decisions and stating “when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter.”).
374.
Id.
375.
See ICCPR supra note 4, art. 21; see also Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 63,
paras. 248–50.
376.
COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Albania”)(an executive order provided a ban and fines for all gatherings, specifically mentioning political gatherings).
377.
See COVID-19 and Special Procedures, supra note 359 (stating that the ‘principles
of non-discrimination, participation, empowerment and accountability in particular needs to
be applied. Particular attention should be paid to people in vulnerable situations”).
378.
See id.
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public health, is it relevant to how serious the risk of infection is in the location where the assembly is to take place? For example, should an election be
permitted to go forward in a relatively isolated area of a country where the
virus has not yet spread, whereas it might be lawful to postpone or cancel a
similar gathering for an election in New York City or another metropolis
where hospitals threaten to be overwhelmed by the disease? Many of these
questions are at the heart of an analysis of whether a restriction is necessary
in a democratic society in the interest of public health.
These fact patterns are not hypothetical but have already emerged in the
months since COVID-19 erupted into our social and political lives. Elections have been conducted, for example, in South Korea and some U.S.
states, but more often they have been delayed, as in Poland, New Zealand
379
and many U.S. state presidential primaries. In Burundi and Guinea, dictators are reportedly proceeding with elections because they know COVID-19
380
will keep election observers away. Protests against COVID-19-related
stay-at-home orders have occurred in many U.S. states: Most have been
381
permitted, but some have been at least partially dispersed by police. U.S.
authorities may also have misused COVID-19 measures in policing protests
382
sparked by the death of George Floyd in police custody. Health care

379.
See Choe Sang-Hun, In South Korea Vote, Virus Delivers Landslide Win to Governing Party, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/15
/world/asia/south-korea-election.html. (stating despite being one of the first states to face serious infection and restrictions as a result of COVID-19 South Korea held national elections for
Parliament on April 15, 2020); Nick Corasaniti & Stephanie Saul, 16 States Have Postponed Primaries During the Pandemic. Here’s a List., N.Y. TIMES, (May 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/2020-campaign-primary-calendar-coronavirus.html (Similarly, 16 U.S. states delayed presidential primaries because of the risk of COVID-19 transmission and regulations limiting public gatherings); Joanna Berendt & Marc Santora, Pandemic
Forces Poland to Delay Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES, (May 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/world/europe/poland-presidential-electioncoronavirus.html (Poland’s May 10 Presidential election was delayed because of COVID-19related restrictions and political debate about whether the election delay gave the incumbent a
greater opportunity to campaign on state-dominated television while the opposition has been
unable to campaign during the virus lockdown); Damien Cave, New Zealand Election
Delayed Amid New Coronavirus Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/17/world/asia/new-zealand-election-coronavirus.html
380.
Covid-19 Helps Ballot-Dodgers in Africa, ECONOMIST, (May 16, 2020),
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/05/16/covid-19-helps-ballotdodgers-in-africa.
381.
See Manny Fernandez, Conservatives Fuel Protests Against Coronavirus Lockdowns, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/us/texas-protestsstay-at-home.html (Protesting in Michigan and Texas were partially restricted by police enforcing stay-at-home orders, while other parts of those protests went forward uneventfully.
Other demonstrations against COVID-19-inspired stay-at-home orders have taken place in
Ohio, Indiana, Nevada and Maryland, often under the “You Can’t Close America” banner
used in Austin, Texas).
382.
See Robinson Meyer, The Protests Will spread the Coronavirus, ATLANTIC (June 1,
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/06/protests-pandemic/612460/ (citing
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workers from New York to Malawi have staged public protests over a lack
of protective gear, and Amazon closed its operations in France after French
authorities responded to worker protests by threatening to level heavy fines
383
against the company. In Iraqi Kurdistan, public workers protesting withholding of salaries were arrested, along with a journalist, under a COVID384
19 law banning public gatherings. India’s police used a COVID-19 ban on
public gatherings as an excuse to break up a months-long sit-in protesting a
385
citizenship law as discriminating against Muslims.
COVID-19-related restrictions on freedom of assembly that interfere
with democratic activity and expression should be viewed with suspicion in
a proper balancing analysis under Article 21’s limitation clause. The ICCPR
drafters emphasized that limitations on assemblies that impede democratic
debate merit greater scrutiny than restrictions on mass gatherings in gen386
eral. In the context of COVID-19, restrictions on the assembly which impede elections and interfere with protests over the very restrictions at issue
during the pandemic are among those meriting such scrutiny. Protests about
the extent and length of stay-at-home orders, pay and treatment of workers
during COVID-19, and their impacts on the economy are similarly important topics for democracies to debate in order to reach sound policy decisions. Denmark’s law implementing COVID-19 restrictions, discussed in
the following section of this article, calls these “opinion-shaping protests”
387
and exempts them from restrictions on freedom of assembly. Is the protection of these rights more important than the protection of religious assemblies or cultural performances? The language of Article 21 and the context
of the ICCPR’s drafting seems to prioritize public assemblies relevant to
democratic activity. As such, a proper limitations analysis should not balance all ICCPR rights equally in permitting COVID-19-related health restrictions but rather should scrutinize more strictly restrictions limiting as-

Georgetown professor of health law Alexandra Phelan claiming that pretextual use of public
health to justify arrests of civil rights activists was a motivating factor for the Siracusa principles, and alleging that crowd control and imprisonment practices used in response to the
George Floyd protests violate international law).
383.
See Charles Pensulo, Malawi Health Workers Protest Against Lack of Protective
Gear, ALJAZEERA (Apr. 14, 2020) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/malawi-healthworkers-protest-lack-protective-gear-200414165616071.html; Adam Jeffery, Healthcare
Workers Protest for Vital Protection Equipment, CNBC (Apr. 18, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/18/healthcare-workers-protest-for-vital-protectionequipment.html (photos from nurses protests across the United States); Mathieu Rosemain &
Gwénaëlle Barzic, Amazon to Close French Warehouse Until Next Week After Court Order,
REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2020) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-amazonfrance/amazon-to-close-french-warehouses-until-next-week-after-court-orderidUSKCN21X192.
384.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Iraq”).
385.
See id. (searching “India”).
386.
ICCPR supra note 4, art. 21 (“necessary in a democratic society”).
387.
See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Denmark”).
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semblies crucial to elections or public debate, including debates on the
democratic nature and permissibility of COVID-19-related restrictions
themselves.

3. Lessons from National Jurisprudence on Limiting Public Assemblies
From the previous examples, the type of assembly and message it promotes clearly are relevant to a limitations-based balancing, even when public health protections are at issue. One could argue that temporary health restrictions should yield for elections, important public dissent, debate or
manifestation about the emergency measures themselves, and other group
activity necessary in a democratic society. If public health restrictions on
assemblies should be evaluated based on their impact on certain types of
democratic expression, it would also make sense for legislatures and officials to consider domestic jurisprudence specific to restrictions on freedom
of assembly.
European examples offer some instructive factors. For example, the
OSCE developed guidelines in 2006 on freedom of peaceful assembly, ar388
ticulating important principles for limitations. These include a presumption in favor of permitting peaceful assemblies, a state’s positive obligation
to facilitate and protect peaceful assemblies, good administration and accountability in government conduct regulating assemblies, and principles of
389
legality, proportionality, and non-discrimination. The last of these OSCE
elements parallels the Siracusa Principles’ and General Comments’ efforts
390
at harmonizing ICCPR language into legal tests. Interestingly, the OSCE
guidelines offer five additional criteria for consideration:
3.1 Legitimate grounds for restriction. The legitimate grounds for
restriction are prescribed in international and regional human rights
instruments. These should not be supplemented by additional
grounds in domestic legislation.
3.2 Public space. Assemblies are as legitimate uses of public space
as commercial activity or the movement of vehicular and pedestrian
traffic. This must be acknowledged when considering the necessity
of any restrictions.
3.3 Content-based restrictions. Assemblies are held for a common
expressive purpose and, thus, aim to convey a message. Restrictions on the visual or audible content of any message should
face a high threshold and should only be imposed if there is an imminent threat of violence.
3.4 “Time, place and manner” restrictions. A wide spectrum of possible restrictions that do not interfere with the message communi-

388.
389.
390.

See generally Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, supra note 363.
Id. at 15–17.
See id.; c.f. supra Section II.B.2.
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cated is available to the regulatory authority. Reasonable alternatives should be offered if any restrictions are imposed on the time,
place or manner of an assembly.
3.5 “Sight and sound.” Public assemblies are held to convey a message to a particular target person, group or organization. Therefore,
as a general rule, assemblies should be facilitated within “sight and
391
sound” of their target audience.
We will consider each of these in turn, as applied to COVID-19-related
health restrictions that impact freedom of assembly.
The question of Section 3.1 of the OSCE’s guidelines on whether a legitimate ground for restriction exists is answered affirmatively by ICCPR
Article 21. Public health is a specific legitimate grounds for restriction
392
acknowledged in articles of the ICCPR. Section 3.2’s concern that public
space be protected for both commercial and political assemblies suggests
that as public space reopens for commerce and traffic, it should similarly
393
reopen for assemblies seeking to deliver a political message. Likewise,
Section 3.4’s guidance related to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions reinforces our advice that legislatures consider alternatives, both
394
online and offline.
Section 3.3’s focus not to “interfere with the message” conveyed by an
395
assembly strikes at the heart of factors governments should consider in a
proper limitations balancing analysis of COVID-19-related restrictions on
assemblies. Under the ICCPR, the balance must rest in favor of permitting
396
expression, especially expression related to issues in a democratic society.
Respecting Section 3.3’s concern about not restricting the content of assembly messages is extremely challenging in the context of COVID-19. Certain
aspects of content are key in deciding whether to permit a restriction on an
assembly impacting public health. Thus, assemblies whose content contains
a political theme related to democratic rights should, in fact, receive greater
consideration. Content-neutrality is important in a different way: restrictions
should be non-discriminatory for a political viewpoint, but content-neutral
does not mean thematic content is irrelevant. In fact, restrictions that interfere with political messages should have a higher level of scrutiny than restrictions that interfere with, for example, sporting events.
Some European countries have put the principles behind the OSCE
Guidelines into practice as they regulate freedom of assembly during the

391.
See Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, supra note 363, § 3 at 17.
392.
See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 21.
393.
See Fernandez, supra note 381 (advocating greater commercial reopening); c.f.
Chicago v. Mosley 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (overturning ordinance permitting labor protests,
but not school segregation complaints, near a school).
394.
See infra Part VI.B.4.
395.
See Chicago v. Mosley 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
396.
See supra Part VI.B.1–2.
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COVID-19 crisis. For instance, Denmark’s COVID-19 response law is a
best practice, as it includes exceptions for what it calls “opinion-shaping as397
semblies,” or those assemblies that might contribute to democratic debate.
398
Greenland’s law includes a similar exception. Germany’s federal stay-athome order did not exempt political gatherings, but its Constitutional Court
ruled that COVID-19-inspired limits on freedom of assembly were overbroad and remanded a decision, allowing an anti-COVID-19 protest to go
399
forward.
U.S. jurisprudence analyzing freedom of assembly reaches similar conclusions. In Cox v. New Hampshire, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on a public assembly were law400
ful. The Court ruled that interests in public safety, such as the orderly
conduct of parades or other large gatherings, justified reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions on demonstrations by a group of Jehovah’s
401
witnesses. More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in National Socialist
Party of America v. Village of Skokie ruled that a government could not ban
a public assembly simply because it contained images (in this case swasti402
kas) that a majority of citizens considered abhorrent.
This content neutrality rule was made clearest in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,
where the Supreme Court held the government, could not selectively exclude speakers from the public sphere based on the content of their mes403
sage. In that case, Earl Mosley was told by Chicago police he would be
arrested if he continued picketing against segregation in Chicago public
schools because of a Chicago ordinance banning all picketing, except for
labor protests, within 150 meters of a school. The Court ultimately ruled
that content and viewpoint neutrality was an essential requirement for otherwise permitted time, place and manner restrictions on freedom of assembly:
[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose
views it finds acceptable but deny use to those wishing to express
less favored or more controversial views. And it may not select
which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities.
There is an “equality of status in the field of ideas,” and the government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be
heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some
groups, the government may not prohibit others from assembling or

397.
See COVID Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Denmark”).
398.
See id. (searching “Greenland”).
399.
See Kate Martyr, Top German Court: Coronavirus Restrictions Not Grounds to
Ban All Protests, DEUTSCHE WELLE (April 4, 2020), https://p.dw.com/p/3b1kI.
400.
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574–76 (1941).
401.
Id.
402.
Nat’l Socialist Party of America v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1977).
403.
Chicago v. Mosley 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
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speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone and
404
may not be justified by reference to content alone.
In May 2020, the Supreme Court upheld a California order closing
churches and later limiting them to twenty-five percent capacity during the
405
COVID-19 crisis. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized
the need for technical expertise in making “fact-intensive” decisions about
stay-at-home-orders and underscored the non-discriminatory nature of limits
406
placed on churches.
Finally, states adopting freedom of assembly restrictions because of
COVID-19 should consider carefully the idea behind Section 3.5 of the
OSCE guidelines focused on whether the message of an assembly is within
“sight and sound” of the desired audience. This concept creates an appropriate parallel to the “necessary in a democratic society” test because this section of the OSCE guidelines considers the democratic nature of the messages conveyed by a protest. So, for example, evaluating whether assemblies
can continue to get across a message of democratic dissent or reach the audience intended seems a more appropriate way to structure an assembly restriction than numerical limitations on gatherings largely applied to
COVID-19. Like the ICCPR drafting body and the UN, the OSCE is as
much a political as a legal body; perhaps this explains why its analysis captures the kind of ideological questions about democracy faced by the
407
ICCPR’s drafters.

4. Offering and Protecting Alternatives to Assemblies, Including
Online Options
Modern society’s online alternatives for peaceful assembly seem especially important to the evolution of legal tests applied to COVID-19-related
restrictions under the ICCPR. Modern telecommunications tools offer a similar new lens in considering whether a state’s restrictions are proportional or
no more restrictive than required for their purpose. A world of Zoom, Webex, FaceTime, and other video-conferencing software has now made it

404.
Id. at 96.
405.
See South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613
(2020) (Roberts, J. concurring).
406.
Id.
407.
The author has observed the political and legal nature of these bodies through participation in sessions of the OSCE, the UN Human Rights Council and the UNGA’s Third
Committee on matters related to freedom of assembly, including defending the U.S. position
on policing of demonstrations by the “Occupy Movement” in the United States in 2011-12.
See, e.g., Eric Richardson, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Intervention
Regarding the ODIHR Report Monitoring of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Selected
OSCE Participating States, Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Freedom of Assembly and Association, (Nov. 8–9, 2012), https://www.osce.org/odihr/93722.
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possible for a range of public assemblies to take place in cyber-space. The
existence of these online alternatives might make a restriction on public assemblies important to a democratic society more tolerable when balancing
against public health interests.
If, however, limiting in-person gatherings defeats the public message or
pressure that protestors intended to deliver through an assembly, then online
alternatives do not necessarily make an otherwise overly restrictive ban on
assembly into a lawful limitation. An online protest can simply be turned off
or ignored, whereas a public demonstration in front of a capitol building is
difficult to avoid. Thus, the OSCE Guidelines’ consideration of remaining
within “sight and sound’ of the intended audience bear attention in deciding
408
whether online alternatives to a public assembly are sufficient.
Interestingly for an analysis produced at the University of Michigan
Law School, the United States’ first highly public objection to stay-at-home
orders arose April 15, 2020, in Lansing, Michigan. There, hundreds stormed
the state capitol to protest the continuation of a month-old stay-at-home or409
der in Michigan, at the time facing the United States’ third-highest
410
COVID-19 caseload. The rationales deployed by protesters in Lansing
411
varied. Some wanted to return to work. Others expressed political animus
toward the governor issuing the order, with some ultimately charged in a
412
kidnapping plot which aimed to try her for treason. Some protested that
the definition of necessary businesses kept churches, gun shops, and garden
413
centers from opening. The Republican Speaker of Michigan’s House of
Representatives tweeted:
“Non-essential in Michigan: Lawn care, construction, fishing if
boating with a motor, realtors, buying seeds, home improvement
equipment, and gardening supplies. Essential in Michigan: Mariju-

408.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, supra note 363, § 3.5.
409.
See, e.g., Paul Egan & Kara Berg, Thousands Converge on Lansing to Protest
Whitmer’s Stay Home Order, DET. FREE PRESS (Apr. 15, 2020, 7:25 PM)
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/04/15/lansing-capitol-protestmichigan-stay-home-order/5136842002/.
410.
E.g., Trip Gabriel & Jonathan Martin, Gretchen Whitmer Isn’t Backing Down,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/us/politics/gretchenwhitmer-michigan-protests.html.
411.
E.g., Sara Burnett, Michigan Militia Puts Armed Protest in the Spotlight,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/c04cc1df0c958053489bd24bb7fce93f.
412.
E.g., Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Shaila Dewan & Kathleen Gray, FBI Says
Michigan Anti-Government Group Plotted to Kidnap Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2020), Trip Gabriel & Jonathan Martin, Gretchen Whitmer Isn’t Backing Down,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/us/politics/gretchenwhitmer-michigan-protests.html.
413.
See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, How Abortions, Guns and Church Closings Made
Coronavirus a Culture War, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/04/20/us/politics/coronavirus-protests-democrats-republicans.html.
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ana, lottery, and alcohol. Let’s be safe and reasonable. Right now,
414
we’re not!”
A follow-up rally featured protesters toting automatic weapons seeking
415
their right to return to work, shopping, and daily life. The caricature of
protesters wielding guns and blocking ambulances undermines the serious
political debate about when and how to reopen U.S. states for business and
the economic toll that long-term COVID-19-related closures could take.
Moreover, in this case, the location of the public protest appears to have
been essential to the democratic purpose of the protest and online alternatives would seem inadequate. At the same time, online platforms clearly
served as important vehicles for organizing the protest and for amplifying
416
its message before, during, and after the event. A Tennessee antilockdown organizer who launched his movement on Zoom and Twitter said
he started his protests because “if constitutional rights can be taken away
whenever there is a crisis, they are not rights at all—they are permis417
sions.”
California’s COVID-19-related public notice is one best practice, as it
specifically proposes alternatives to public gatherings as a means of political
418
expression. The website offers guidance about alternatives to organizing a
protest and how to engage in political activity, including online and in-car
419
protests, and exemptions for voting.
Among California’s practices that others might consider are: alternatives to physical protests, online assemblies, wearing or displaying symbols,
in-car protests, balloting by mail, and declaring an exception for activities
(such as elections) deemed necessary to a democracy:
State agencies are not issuing permits for any gatherings—of any
size, or any kind—at this time. Gatherings will be permitted again
once public health officials determine they can be conducted in a
manner consistent with public health and safety. In the meantime,
please postpone or cancel your gathering and consider whether you
can find alternative ways to host your event that do not require an

414.
Lee Chatfield (@LeeChatfield), TWITTER (Apr. 11, 2020, 10:08 AM),
https://twitter.com/LeeChatfield/status/1248976304155869190.
415.
Burnett, supra note 411.
416.
See Grace Panetta, Trump Calls Protesters Who Carried Guns Into the Michigan
Capitol ‘Very Good People’ and Says the Governor Should ‘Make a Deal’ With Them, BUS.
INSIDER (May 1, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-protestors-with-guns-inmichigan-capitol-are-very-good-people-2020-5?r=US&IR=T.
417.
Millicent Smith, How the Anti-Lockdown #FreeTN Movement was Launched,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, (Apr. 25, 2020), https://www.timesfreepress.com/news
/local/story/2020/apr/25/anti-lockdown-movement-tennessee/521545/.
418.
Stay Home Q&A, CAL. ALL https://covid19.ca.gov/stay-home-except-for-essentialneeds/ (last updated Oct. 29, 2020, 4:29 PM).
419.
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in-person, physical gathering . . . . There are many ways for you to
express your political views without holding a physical, in-person
gathering. For example, you may continue to call or write elected
officials, write letters to the editor of news publications, display
lawn or window signs, or use online and other electronic media (including Zoom rooms, Twitter feeds, Facebook pages, and other digital forums) to express your views. Additionally, as noted above,
you may leave your home as long as you do not gather with people
who are not members of your household. When you are otherwise
out in public, public health directives do not prevent you from engaging in political expressions—such as by wearing or carrying a
sign—as long as you do not hold a gathering of any size, and otherwise maintain physical distancing. If collective action in physical
space is important to you, consider whether you and other partici420
pants can safely protest from within your cars.
Unfortunately, some countries not only fail to propose online alternatives when they restrict freedom of assembly but also use COVID-19 as a
pretext to shut down the Internet altogether. If a state were to shut down Internet access—as has been done by Indian authorities in Kashmir, by Bang421
ladeshi authorities in Rohingya migrant camps, and by others– the lawfulness of such a move merits strict scrutiny for its negative impact on online
422
alternatives to freedom of assembly and other rights. In the first formal
423
UN Special Rapporteur report about COVID-19, the Special Rapporteur
on Freedom of Expression emphasized the importance of online alternatives

420.
Id.
421.
See Athar Parvaiz, Kashmir Internet Blackouts Hinder Health Services, Contact
Tracing, REUTERS (May 19, 2020, 9:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcoronavirus-india-tech-trfn/kashmir-internet-blackouts-hinder-health-services-contact-tracingidUSKBN22W052; Bangladesh: End Internet Blackout to Protect Public Health of Rohingya
Refugees and Host Communities, GLOB. JUST. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2020),
http://www.globaljusticecenter.net/blog/19-publications/1239-bangladesh-end-internetblackout-to-protect-public-health-of-rohingya-refugees-and-host-communities; Phelim Kine,
Internet Curbs on Rohingya Risk Wider Virus Outbreak, PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., (Mar.
30, 2020), https://phr.org/our-work/resources/internet-curbs-on-rohingya-risk-wider-virusoutbreak/; UN Experts Concerned at Surge in Civilian Casualties in Northwest Myanmar After Internet Shutdown, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”] (Feb. 18, 2020)
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25572&LangID=.
422.
Joseph J. Amon & Margaret Wurth, A Virtual Roundtable on COVID-19 and Human Rights with Human Rights Watch Researchers, HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (Apr. 16, 2020)
https://www.hhrjournal.org/2020/04/a-virtual-roundtable-on-covid-19-and-human-rightswith-human-rights-watch-staff/ (describing where the internet has been shut down as a tool of
repression during COVID-19). But see Adi Radhakrishnan, COVID-19: Restricted Internet
Impacts on Health in Kashmir, HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (Apr. 15, 2020)
https://www.hhrjournal.org/2020/04/covid-19-restricted-internet-impacts-on-health-inkashmir/ (describing what internet restrictions were in place prior to COVID-19)..
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See Kaye, supra note 360, at 9.
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for all human rights. He also noted the devastating impact of Internet shutdowns on the enjoyment of human rights during a pandemic:
Given the migration of all manner of essential services to online
platforms, shutdowns not only restrict expression but also interfere
with other fundamental rights (A/HRC/35/22, ¶ 15). In the context
of the pandemic, it has been especially troubling to observe the
continuation of several instances of Internet shutdowns. The most
prominent has been the long-term disruption that the Government
of India has imposed on Kashmir. . . . India has not been alone. The
Government of Ethiopia imposed a shutdown of Internet services in
the Oromia region at the beginning of 2020, reportedly promising
only at the end of March to end the shutdown. Bangladesh imposed
an Internet blackout affecting Rohingya refugees from Myanmar,
prompting 50 organizations to call for a lifting of the blackout in
the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. The persistence of Internet
shutdowns in parts of Myanmar continues to be of serious concern,
particularly in light of COVID-19. In other contexts, mandate holders have raised concerns related to Iraqi service disruptions. A
growing number of shutdowns have been imposed during election
periods, including in Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia, and Togo. Almost 200 Internet shutdowns of various varieties in 2018 have been
documented, with almost two thirds occurring in India, and the remainder occurring principally in Asia, the Middle East, and Afri424
ca.
The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Association and Assembly
made similar points among “Ten Key Principles,” he announced in April
425
2020.
Clearly, Internet shutdowns are at odds with the ICCPR requirement
that restrictions are “necessary in a democratic society.” Of course, many
societies who have imposed these restrictions are not democracies, although
India is the world’s largest democracy and the country imposing the most
426
Internet shutdowns. The damage of Internet shutdowns underscores the
importance of modernizing our limitations analysis to consider online alternatives not just for freedom of expression, but also for freedom of assembly

424.
Id. at 9 (internal citations omitted).
425.
See Clément Voule, States Responses to Covid 19 Threat Should not Halt Freedoms of Assembly and Association, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”]
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
25788&LangID=E (emphasizing the importance of online assembly in principles 2, 5 and 7).
426.
See Sage Chen & Berhan Taye, Targeted, Cut Off, and Left in the Dark: How Internet Shutdowns Became an Even Greater Threat to Human Rights in 2019, ACCESSNOW,
(Feb. 24, 2020, 6:59 PM) https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-2019-review/; Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right of Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age Research Paper 1/2019 (June 2019).
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and other rights. If a state considers online alternatives in analyzing proposed limitations, then the state should—as the Special Rapporteur suggests—judge Internet shutdowns particularly harshly. It is almost impossible to imagine how an Internet shutdown would be “necessary in a
427
democratic society” or justified under tests of necessity or proportionality.

5. Need to Rebalance once the Emergency Ends
Perhaps most important, states need a legally rigorous and transparent
analysis of restrictions on IHRL principles like freedom of assembly, because any balancing analysis needs to be updated as the circumstances of
the virus-related emergency change. In the case of freedom of assembly, if
states simply decide that, because of the limited nature of Article 21, it is
acceptable to limit assemblies for public health purposes, those societies
could lose the built-in opportunity for reconsideration of emergency
measures a derogation provides. The ICCPR framework for derogation includes the idea that measures should be time-limited and that restrictions
should go away when the emergency resolves. But, if states justify restrictions based on a limitations analysis, the law provides no such opportunity for reconsideration. It remains essential that restrictions continue only
for the duration of the emergency and that opportunities for public assembly—particularly those related to political rights—are rapidly and compre428
hensively restored. One core reason why states are encouraged to derogate
under Article 4 rather than merely undertake a balancing test or limitations
analysis is that restrictions, once put in place, often have inertia and momentum that makes them difficult to remove.
Even if a rigorous balancing analysis prioritizes rights necessary in a
democracy, the end of an emergency means that all rights should be restored—including those that might not be considered necessary in a democracy. For example, religious congregants certainly enjoy elements of their
rights to religious freedom and free expression from in-person meetings,
which may be impossible or less intense when done via online platforms. As
a result, the existence of video conferencing and other distance technologies
should not be a justification for eroding their freedom of assembly once an
emergency ends. Delaying exercise of rights might be justifiable in a health
emergency, but rights should not be forever limited just because a state conducted a limitations analysis rather than following the clearly time-limited
pathway of derogation. This is just one example of why full freedoms of

427.
We view Internet shutdowns as almost always unjustified in a “limitations”-based
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peaceful assembly must be restored once the COVID-19 emergency has
passed and why limitations analyses if deployed, must be reconsidered
throughout the various phases of the epidemic.

VII. CONCLUSION
States must keep human rights at the forefront as they continue to respond to the global health crisis caused by COVID-19. It is paramount that
states maintain respect for the international legal system as a whole and the
individuals protected by it. The ICCPR contemplates that in a time of a public health emergency, states may restrict rights enshrined in the treaty in order to respond to the crisis effectively. States should utilize these mechanisms but need to be transparent about how they justify their actions. The
Human Rights Committee should provide additional guidance about when
states should move from using limitations to derogations as the preferred
mechanism to implement restrictions. More rigorous limitations analysis by
states should consider the phase of disease prevention at issue; prioritizing
rights necessary in a democracy; and modern alternatives for promoting and
protecting human rights, especially online alternatives; and privacyprotecting technologies. Under either a derogation or a limitations analysis,
states must recognize that restrictions need to be informed by experts outside of the law, especially in the fields of medicine, public health, and technology, in order to assess the substantive requirements of emergency
measures adequately. Finally, states must ensure that emergency measures
do not extend beyond the current crisis by assessing their temporality
through the procedural requirements of derogation or the proportionality assessment of a limitation analysis.
As the pandemic unfolds, we hope that states will thoroughly consider
their international human rights obligations in implementing emergency
measures and that this article has provided some best practices and other
guidance on how states can improve their analysis and response to COVID19 in compliance with the ICCPR. Times of crisis provide the global community an opportunity to renew its commitment to human rights, and we
hope that states will rise to the occasion.

